Dalton Jaques, Severo Rodriguez, Elisha Delgarza, Nicholas Rodarte, Jodi Poll Holbrook, Pamela Smith, Doug Kasten, Kennifer Torrance, Muriel Torrance, Melissa Thomas, Gregory Heiner, Ryan Mccormick, Jennifer Mccormick, Kent ballard, and Ronda Ballard v. Midway Auto Plaza, INC. and Mike Riddle, INC : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
Dalton Jaques, Severo Rodriguez, Elisha Delgarza,
Nicholas Rodarte, Jodi Poll Holbrook, Pamela
Smith, Doug Kasten, Kennifer Torrance, Muriel
Torrance, Melissa Thomas, Gregory Heiner, Ryan
Mccormick, Jennifer Mccormick, Kent ballard, and
Ronda Ballard v. Midway Auto Plaza, INC. and
Mike Riddle, INC : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jack C. Helgesen; Helgesen, Waterfall & Jones; Attorneys for Appellees.
Heinz J. Mahler; Scott C. Powers; Kipp & Christian; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Dalton Jaques, Severo Rodriguez, Elisha Delgarza, Nicholas Rodarte, Jodi Poll Holbrook, Pamela Smith, Doug Kasten,
Kennifer Torrance, Muriel Torrance, Melissa Thomas, Gregory Heiner, Ryan Mccormick, Jennifer Mccormick, Kent ballard, and Ronda Ballard
v. Midway Auto Plaza, INC. and Mike Riddle, INC, No. 20080985 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1328
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DALTON JAQUES, SEVERO 
RODRIGUEZ, ELISHA 
DELAGARZA, NICHOLAS 
RODARTE, JODI POLL 
HOLBROOK, PAMELA SMITH, 
DOUG KASTEN, JENNIFER 
TORRANCE, MURIEL TORRANCE, 
MELISSA THOMAS, GREGORY 
HEINER, RYAN MCCORMICK, 
JENNIFER MCCORMICK, KENT 
BALLARD, and RONDA BALLARD 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
MIDWAY AUTO PLAZA, INC, and 
MIKE RIDDLE INC, dba MIKE 
RIDDLE MITSUBISHI, and other 
unidentified persons, 
Defendants and Appellants 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20080985-CA 
Trial Court Case No. 040700662 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Interlocutory Appeal from the Second District Court, Davis County 
Judge Michael Allphin 
Heinz J. Mahler 
Scott C. Powers 
Kipp and Christian, P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Jack C. Helgesen 
Helgesen, Waterfall & Jones 
Barnes Bank Building 
849 Hill Field Road, Suite 202 
Layton, UT 84041 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DALTON JAQUES, SEVERO 
RODRIGUEZ, ELISHA 
DELAGARZA, NICHOLAS 
ROD ARTE, JODI POLL 
HOLBROOK, PAMELA SMITH, 
DOUG KASTEN, JENNIFER 
TORRANCE, MURIEL TORRANCE, 
MELISSA THOMAS, GREGORY 
HEINER, RYAN MCCORMICK, 
JENNIFER MCCORMICK, KENT 
BALLARD, and RONDA BALLARD 
and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
MIDWAY AUTO PLAZA, INC., and 
MIKE RIDDLE INC., dba MIKE 
RIDDLE MITSUBISHI, and other 
unidentified persons, 
Defendants and Appellants 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20080985-CA 
Trial Court Case No. 040700662 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Interlocutory Appeal from the Second District Court, Davis County 
Judge Michael Allphin 
Heinz J. Mahler 
Scott C. Powers 
Kipp and Christian, P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Jack C. Helgesen 
Helgesen, Waterfall & Jones 
Barnes Bank Building 
849 Hill Field Road, Suite 202 
Layton, UT 84041 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 2 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 2 
C. DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 19 
ARGUMENT 23 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A PRIVATE 
RIGHT OF ACTION EXISTS UNDER THE UTAH INSURANCE CODE . . . 23 
A. The District Court's Ruling Finding a Private Right of Action 
Contradicts Section 31A-2-201 and Abrogates the Authority 
of the Insurance Department 23 
B. There Is No Private Right of Action, Express of Implied, that 
Supports Appellees' Claims 32 
C. It Is Error to Imply a Private Right of Action 
When a Statutory Scheme Is Regulatory in Nature 34 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S CERTIFICATION OF THE 
DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEES, VTP, AND GAP CLASSES 
WAS IMPROPER 36 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. The Legal Standard for Certification Under Rule 23 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 36 
B. Certification of the Documentary Service Fees ("Doc Fee") 
Classes was Improper 39 
1. Class certification was improper because Appellees 
cannot meet the Commonality, Typicality 
and Adequacy of Representation requirements of 
Rule 23(a) 40 
2. Class certification was improper because Appellees 
cannot meet the Predominance and Superiority 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) 49 
C. Certification of the Vehicle Theft Protection ("VTP") 
Classes was Improper 52 
1. Class certification was improper because Appellees 
cannot meet the Commonality, Typicality 
and Adequacy of Representation requirements of 
Rule 23(a) 52 
2. Class certification was improper because Appellees 
cannot meet the Predominance and Superiority 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) 59 
D. Certification of the Guaranteed Automobile Protection Insurance 
("GAP insurance") Classes was Improper 61 
1. Class certification was improper because Appellees 
cannot meet the Commonality, Typicality 
and Adequacy of Representation requirements of 
Rule 23(a) 61 
2. Class certification was improper because Appellees 
cannot meet the Predominance and Superiority 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) .68 
CONCLUSION 70 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDA: A Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-105 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-101 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-2-201 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-203 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-203.5 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-306 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
B Follow-up Statement to Insurance Code Task Force; Re: 
Chapter 15, Unauthorized Insurers and Surplus Lines p.6, Clark 
B. Fetzer, Asst. Attorney General, Sep. 3, 1985 (Inventory of 
Bill Drafting and Comment Files from Insurance Code Task 
Force 1985-86, Utah State Archives Collection, Series 25137, 
Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 7). 
C Utah Code Ann. § 31-38-2 (1974) (Repealed 1985). 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UTAH SUPREME COURT CASES 
Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842 (Utah 2004) 32 
Callv. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986) 2, 51,52 
Machan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 116 P.3d 342 (Utah 2005) 32,33 
Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592 (Utah 2003) 27,32,34 
Oahvood Vill, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226 (Utah 2004) 36 
R&RIndus. Park, LLC v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n., 
199 P.3d 917, 923 (Utah 2008) 28 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1999) 1 
Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 133 P.3d 428 (Utah 2006) 33 
Surety Underwriters v. E.C Trucking, 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000) 4,5,25,26 
Taylor ex rel. CT. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479 (Utah 1999) 1 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CASES 
Broadbent v. Bd. ofEduc, 910 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 32 
Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 994 P.2d 824 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 33,34 
Hansen v. Eyre, 74 P.3d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 27 
State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 1 
FEDERAL CASES 
Amchem Prods, v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997) 38,46,57 
Brooks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 133 F.R.D. 54 (S.D. Fla. 1990) 45, 65 
Ditty v. Check Rite, Ltd., 182 F.R.D. 639 (D. Utah 1998) 36,38,46,57 
iv 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hewitt v. Joyce Beverages of Wise, Inc., 721 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1983) 38 
Hyderi v. Washington Mutual Bank, 235 F.R.D. 390 (N.D. 111. 2006) 38 
JB. ex rel Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 1999) 36,37 
Johnson v. Rohr-Ville Motors, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 363 (N.D. 111. 1999) 62,63 
Reedv. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir. 1988) 36,40,61 
Rex v. Owens, 585 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.1978) 37 
Roy Veal v. Crown Auto Dealerships, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 572 (M.D. Fla. 2006) 54 
Rugumbwa v. Betten Motor Sales, 200 F.R.D. 358 (W.D. Mich. 2001) 37 
Van Zanen v. Qwest Wireless, L.L.C., 550 F.Supp.2d 1261 (D. Colo. 2007), 
aff d Van Zanen v. Qwest Wireless, L.L.C, 522 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2008) . . . 34 
Violette v. P.A. Days, Inc., 214 F.R.D. 207 (S.D. Ohio 2003) 54 
Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 97 F.R.D. 440 (D. Ore. 1983) . . 39,50,52,60,69 
Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147 (D. Kan. 1996) 37,42,47,55,63 
OTHER STATE CASES 
American Auto. Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 812 So.2d 309, 312 (Ala. 2001) 34 
Asbwy Automotive Group, Inc. v. Palasack, 237 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Ark. 2006) 47 
Peterson v. Cellco Partnership, 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1595, 
80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316, 325 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 2008) 29,34 
RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23 2,3,5,20,21,22,23,36,38,39,40,42,46,49,50, 
52,53,55,56,57,59,60,61,63,65,66,68,69,70 
Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1 
v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-1 39 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-102 2,35 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-201 2,23,24,27,31,32 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-203 2,24,35 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-203.5 2,24,35 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-306 2,26 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-101 2,25,26,27,28,29,30,31 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-105 2,4,5,19,24,25,26,27,30 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-210 39 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 1 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 
Utah Administrative Code R877-23 V 39-40 
VI 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4- 103(2)(j) which states that the Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction 
over issues relating to orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record which are 
transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-
4-103(2)(j) (2008). On January 6, 2009 this matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Defendants/Appellants have presented two primary issues in this matter. 
Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellants' Motion to Dismiss 
based on the argument that a private right of action to enforce the insurance code does not 
exist. (ROA 2091-2114; 2193). 
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See, Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 
1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999). 
Additionally, a question of legislative intent associated with statutory interpretation is a 
matter of law, not of fact. See State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469,471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Issue No. 2: Whether the trial court erred in certifying the Documentary Service Fee 
(Doc Fee), Vehicle Theft Policies (VTP), and Guaranteed Auto Protection (GAP) classes. 
(ROA 2091-2114; 2193). 
Standard of Review: A district court's certification of a class is reviewed under an 
1 
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abuse of discretion standard. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 184 (Utah 1986). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following statutes and rules are of central importance to this appeal and are set 
out verbatim in Addendum A attached hereto: Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-101; Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-15-105; Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-101; Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-102; Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-2-201; Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-203; Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-203.5; 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-306; and Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a class action suit purportedly filed on behalf of individuals purchasing new 
and used automobiles from Mike Riddle Mitsubishi ("MRM") and Midway Auto Plaza 
("Midway"). At the time these individuals purchased their vehicles from the Appellants, the 
putative class members either (1) purchased various products referred to as Vehicle Theft 
Policies ("VTP"), (2) obtained Guaranteed Automobile Protection ("GAP") insurance, and/or 
(3) paid dealer documentary service fees ("Doc Fees"). The class action seeks a ruling from 
the Court that MRM and Midway did not comply with various aspects of Utah law in relation 
to their charging for and/or sale of the VTP products, GAP insurance and Doc Fees. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This action was originally filed on December 30, 2004. (ROA 1). Later, on June 1, 
2005, the Appellees filed a "Class Action Amended Complaint"which was served on the 
Appellants in July, 2005. (ROA 183). On November 14, 2005 the Appellees filed a "Class 
2 
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Action Second Amended Complaint." (ROA 183). On May 17, 2007 the Appellees filed 
their Motion for Certification of Class Re: Vehicle Theft Policies, Motion for Certification 
of Class Re: GAP Insurance, and Motion for Certification of Class Re: Dealer Documentary 
Service Fees. (ROA 405, 511, 563). On June 29, 2007 Appellants filed a Memoranda in 
Opposition to each of the Appellees5 certification motions. (ROA 630, 773, 924). 
Additionally, the Utah Automobile Dealers Association filed an Amicus Curiae in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class on June 29, 2007. (ROA 1066). On 
September 12, 2007 the Appellees filed reply memoranda in support of their Motions for 
Certification. (ROA 1170, 1235, 1346, 1464), Soon thereafter, on September 28, 2007 the 
Appellants filed their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class Claims Challenging Vehicle Theft 
and Gap Insurance Policies. (ROA 1607). Appellees' filed their response to Appellants' 
Motion to Dismiss on November 1, 2007 and Appellants' filed a Reply on November 19, 
2007. (ROA 1633, 1781). 
The Court held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and two of the Motions for Class 
Certification, those for VTP and GAP insurance on April 24, 2008. (ROA 1833). On May 
28, 2008 the Court held a hearing on the Motion for the Certification of the Dealer 
Documentary Service Fees class. (ROA 2090). 
On July 30, 2008 the Court issued a 'Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Class Claims Challenging Vehicle Theft and GAP Insurance Policies and Ruling 
on Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Re: Vehicle Theft Policies and Ruling on 
3 
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Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Re: GAP Insurance and Ruling on Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Certification of Class Re: Dealer Documentary Service Fees and Ruling on 
Defendants' Motion to Strike." (ROA 2091-2114). The July 30, 2008 ruling denied the 
Appellants' Motion to Dismiss and granted the Appellees' class certification Motions. Id. 
After receiving the July 30, 2008 ruling, on August 29, 2008 the Appellants filed a 
Motion to Reconsider or Alternatively, for a Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal. (ROA 
2115). On November 7, 2008, after the Appellants' Motion to Reconsider had been fully 
briefed, the Court entered a Ruling again denying the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss and 
granting the Appellees' class certifications Motions. (ROA 2191). 
The Appellants thereafter filed a Notice of Filing of Petition for Interlocutory Appeal 
in the Utah Supreme Court on December 3,2008. (ROA 2198). The Utah Supreme Court 
granted permission to appeal on January 16, 2009. (ROA 2198). 
C. DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The July 30, 2008 ruling denied the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss and granted the 
Appellees' Motions for Certification. (ROA 2092). With regard to the Appellants' Motion 
to Dismiss, the Court stated that it found the case of Surety Underwriters v. E.C. Trucking, 
10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000) dispositive, since it purportedly upheld a private right of action 
under subsection (1) of §31 A-15-105 and this would, by extension, also allow a private right 
of action for subsection (2) of the same statute. (ROA 2099-2100). Upon reconsideration 
of the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss, however, the Court acknowledged that its analysis of 
Surety Underwriters v. E.C, Trucking, 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000) was misapplied since its 
4 
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holding merely stated that § 31A-15-105 (1) was a valid affirmative defense. (ROA 2193). 
However, despite noting that "it is possible that the Court's interpretation of the statute is 
incorrect" the Court nevertheless upheld its interpretation of the statute to allow a private 
right of action. (ROA 2193). 
With regard to the Plaintiffs5 Motions for Certification, the Court's initial ruling found 
that Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) were satisfied since (a) numerosity had been stipulated to; (b) 
there was commonality for Doc Fee classes because there was a common question regarding 
whether the actions of the Appellants violated the law and thus rendered the Doc Fees 
invalid; the VTP classes involved a simple question as to whether the Appellants' sold an 
insurance product at a time when the Appellants did not have a license to sell insurance 
products, and the GAP classes involved a simple question as to whether the Appellees 
purchased an invalid insurance policy from one of the Appellant dealerships since they did 
not have direct privity of contract with a licensed insurer; (c) the typicality requirement 
merged with the commonality requirement; (d) the class representatives requirement is not 
stringent and therefore the proffered representatives are adequate absent a showing that their 
interests are "antagonistic" to the other members of the class; and (e) the predominance and 
superiority requirements of 23(b)(3) were satisfied because the commonality and typicality 
requirements had been met and the individual claims, if brought alone, were too small to 
merit individual litigation. (ROA 2102-2113). However, the Court required that there 
should be three distinct VTP classes: (1) those purchasing an "Etch" product from Midway 
5 
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Auto Plaza, (2) those purchasing an "Etch" product from Mike Riddle Mitsubishi, and (3) 
those purchasing a "VTP" product from Midway Auto Plaza. (ROA 2102-2113). 
In its Ruling on Appellants' Motion to Reconsider or Alternatively, for a Stay Pending 
Interlocutory Appeal and Ruling on Appellants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Order, the 
Court stated that the circumstances surrounding the various sales were sufficiently similar 
that they "constitute a common course of conduct related to sales of specific types of 
products, and the commonality and typicality prongs are satisfied." (ROA 2195). Therefore 
it did not modify its initial rulings on the class certifications. Id. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs/Appellees are purchasers of vehicles from Appellant Midway, located 
in Layton, Utah, and Appellant MRM, located in Woods Cross, Utah. (ROA 36-157; ROA 
183-259). 
2. Each Appellee purchased a car under unique facts and circumstances: some 
signed multiple sets of contracts (Dalton Jaques) while some signed one set (Gregory 
Heiner); some traded in a vehicle (Nicholas Rodarte) while others did not (Jodi Poll 
Holbrook); and some relied on Appellants to obtain financing (Melissa Thomas) while others 
obtained their own loans (Gregory Heiner). (ROA 190-199, 637, 668-687, 712). 
3. Appellant Midway, which began doing business before 2000, sells used cars 
and Appellant MRM, which began doing business in February 2004, sells primarily new 
cars. (ROA 638). 
4. Midway and MRM are separate entities and have separate business practices, 
6 
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bookkeeping, management, employee manuals, and training materials. (ROA 638, 690). 
Procedural History of the Case 
5. Appellees filed a Complaint on December 30, 2004, alleging various causes 
of action, including fraud and violations of several Utah statutes. (ROA 1-35) 
6. Appellees filed a Class Action Amended Complaint on June 1, 2005. The 
Complaint alleged various causes of action associated with Appellants' practices of (a) 
charging Dealer Documentary Service Fees ("Doc Fees"), (b) selling Vehicle Theft Policies 
("VTP"), and selling Guaranteed Automobile Protection policies ("GAP"). (ROA 36-157) 
7. On March 23, 2006 the parties entered a Stipulated Case Management Order 
and Initial Attorneys Planning Meeting Report ("Order"), severing the claims of the 
individual Appellees from the class claims and stipulating that the individual claims would 
proceed separately from the class claims. The Order bifurcated discovery into Phase 1, 
which relates to class certification, and Phase 2, which relates to the merits of any claims 
certified for class treatment. Phase 1 of discovery has been completed. (ROA 260,638). 
8. In accordance with the Order, Appellees filed a Class Action Second Amended 
Complaint on November 11,2005, solely challenging Appellants' charging of Doc Fees and 
the selling ofVTP and GAP. (ROA 183-259). 
The Sales Process at Midway and MRM 
9. The process of selling a vehicle varies according to the particular customer and 
dealership involved. (Depo. Reid Teo, ROA 704-723; Aff. Gary Howe, ROA 1128-1131; 
Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-702). 
7 
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10. In general, at both Midway and MRM, if a customer wishes to purchase a 
vehicle after talking with the salesperson and, in some cases, taking a test drive, the customer 
sits down with the salesperson and begins negotiating the terms of the sale. (Depo. Reid Teo, 
ROA 704-723). 
11. Sometimes, but not always, a trade-in vehicle is involved in the transaction, and 
the general manager of either MRM or Midway evaluates the value of the trade-in vehicle. 
(Depo. Mike Dockery, ROA 725-729). 
12. Transactions involving trade-ins involve much more paperwork than 
transactions without a trade-in. (ROA 638). 
13. Sometimes a customer pays the full sticker price of the car, sometimes the price 
varies from the sticker price because of features and options sought by the customer, and 
sometimes the general manager discounts the vehicle through a series of negotiations. 
(Depo. Reid Teo, ROA 704-723). 
14. Frequently, but not always, the salesperson gives the customer a rough estimate 
of the monthly payment range, and the price of the car plus tax, license, and fees. (Depo. 
Reid Teo, ROA 704-723). 
15. These estimates are sometimes taken to the general manager's office and, after 
the general manager reviews the proposed terms, the salesman returns with a separate 
document, called a "pencil" or "write- up." (Depo. Reid Teo, ROA 704-723). 
16. Although in some cases the "pencil" is signed by the customer, customers can 
8 
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renegotiate the deal after signing the "pencil" (Depo. Reid Teo, ROA 704-723). 
17. Negotiation worksheets, including "pencils," do not contain contractual 
language and terms, the "pencil" is not considered to be a binding contract, and there is no 
legal obligation to buy the car if only the "pencil" is signed. (Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 
689-702; Amicus Curiae Brief of Utah Automobile Dealers Association, ROA1066-1114). 
18. Typically, the customer next visits the Finance and Insurance Office, which is 
where the legal documents are prepared and it is in the Finance and Insurance Office that a 
purchaser signs the legally binding contract, which is the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale. 
(Depo. Reid Teo, ROA 704-723; Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-702). 
19. Before the customer signs the contract, the finance manager explains the 
financial portions of the contract line by line and also explains the Truth in Lending Act 
disclosure. (Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-702; Depo. Jason Earl, ROA 731-739). 
20. In some cases, Midway or MRM arranges financing for the customer. In such 
cases, the customer also signs a Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement around 
the same time that he or she signs the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale. (Depo. Spencer 
Castle, ROA 689-702). 
21. The Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement form used by 
Appellants is similar to or the same as that accepted and used by the Utah Banker's and 
Automobile Dealers'Associations. (Amicus Brief, ROA 1066-1114). 
22. If financing is required, the finance manager will generally submit a generic 
9 
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credit application signed by the customer to several different financial institutions and, in 
most cases, the bank or financial institution sends word of approval or disapproval while the 
customer is still in the finance manager's office. (Amicus Brief, ROA1066-1114). 
23. The amount of time it takes to obtain financing and complete the paperwork 
for a customer depends on considerations such as the number of lenders contacted and the 
credit history of the purchaser. (ROA 641; Aff. Gary Howe, ROA 1128-1131). 
24. The Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement identifies the dealer 
as the seller, the customer as the buyer, and the lender agreeing to finance the loan as the 
assignee. (Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-702). 
25. Title clerks and office workers at MRM and Midway prepare and then take the 
paperwork for the purchased car to the appropriate state agency, register the purchased car, 
and obtain the car's license plates. (Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-702). 
Dealer Documentary Service Fees (Doc Fees) 
26. The Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division ("Division") is primarily responsible 
for overseeing the charging of Doc Fees. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1115 - 1120). 
27. The Division has not established any set Doc Fee amount that can be charged, 
and the Utah Legislature has not regulated Doc Fees. (Id.). 
28. Although the Division requires all car dealerships to prominently display signs 
at the dealership explaining Doc Fees, posting these signs in the dealership's Finance and 
Insurance Offices complies with the requirements. (Id.). 
29. Officers from the Division randomly inspect dealerships to make sure they 
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have Doc Fees signs prominently displayed, preferably in the Finance and Insurance Offices. 
(Amicus Brief, ROA1075). 
30. Neither Midway nor MRM has ever been cited for violating state regulations 
governing Doc Fees. (Aff. Nancy Wilde, ROA 741 -745; Aff. Camille Wilde, ROA 747-751). 
31. At both Midway and MRM, Doc Fees signs are openly displayed in the Finance 
and Insurance Offices. (Depo. Reid Teo, ROA 704-723; Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-
702; Depo. Mike Dockery, ROA 725-729; Depo. Jason Earl, ROA 731-739; Depo. Daniel 
LePelley, ROA 753-756). 
32. At MRM, during the relevant time period, a Doc Fees sign was also displayed 
on the wall between the lobby and the service center. (Depo. Jason Earl, ROA 731 -739). 
33. The Doc Fees sign that was displayed at both Midway and MRM states: 
THE DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE OF $399.99 AS SET 
FORTH IN YOUR CONTRACT REPRESENTS COSTS AND PROFIT TO 
THE DEALER FOR PREPARING AND PROCESSING DOCUMENTS 
AND OTHER SERVICES RELATED TO THE SALE OR LEASE OF YOUR 
VEHICLE. THESE FEES ARE NOT SET OR STATE MANDATED BY 
STATE STATUTE OR RULE. 
(Aff. Nancy Wilde, Ex. 2, ROA 741-745; Aff. Camille Wilde, Ex. 2, ROA 747-751). 
34. Many customers at Midway asked salespeople about how much the Doc Fee 
was and the salesperson would refer the customer to the finance manager. (Depo. Reid Teo, 
ROA 704-723). 
35. All, or nearly all, dealerships charge Doc Fees to cover, among other things, 
the costs of securing financing for the purchaser, filing paperwork, licensing, and preparing 
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documents. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1117; Aff. Gary Howe, ROA 1128-1131). 
36. Doc Fees also cover the costs of locating, obtaining, and paying for form sale 
contracts. (Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-702; Aff. Gary Howe, ROA 1128-1131) 
37. The amount of the Doc Fees varied during the time periods relevant to this 
action. At Midway, the Doc Fee was $249.00 from prior to 2000 to January 31, 2002; 
$289.95 from January 1, 2003 to September 19,2003; $299.95 from September 20, 2003 to 
August 30, 2004; and $399.95 after August 31,2004. At MRM, the Doc Fee was $299.95 
from February 2004 to August 31,2004, and $399.95 after September 1,2004. (ROA 643). 
38. Generally, few customers object to paying the Doc Fees. (Depo. Jason Earl, 
ROA 731-739). 
39. Some of the named Appellees have admitted that they had no objection to 
paying Doc Fees. (Depo. Melissa Nielson, ROA 759; Depo. Nicholas Rodarte, ROA 765). 
VTP Products 
40. VTP products like those sold by Midway and MRM are common and accepted 
in the industry and are sold by most car dealers in Utah. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1119). 
41. At Midway, two general types of VTP products were sold during the time 
period relevant to this action, although the actual policies and products within these two 
categories differed through the years. (Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 976-988). 
42. From 2001 to 2003, Midway offered a starter interrupt system. Beginning in 
February 2004, Midway began almost exclusively offering acid etching. (ROA 935). 
43. The only VTP product MRM ever offered is acid etching. (ROA 935). 
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44. The starter interrupt system required physical installation of hardware that 
essentially disrupted the vehicle's electrical system and prevented ignition of the vehicle 
without a "second key." (ROA 935). 
45. During some years, starter interrupt systems were installed as a matter of course 
on newer model and higher quality used cars, without prior request from customers. Most 
of these cars were sold without the customer agreeing to pay for the system. (ROA 935). 
46. In these cases, Midway did not activate the "second key" device in the vehicle. 
(ROA 935). 
47. The starter interrupt products sold by Midway also typically provided a 
monetary benefit, such as $1500, if the car was stolen within a certain number of years from 
the starter interrupts purchase date and was not recovered within thirty days. (ROA 936). 
48. Midway estimates that it sold approximately 300 starter interrupt devices to 
Midway customers between 2001 and 2004. (ROA 936). 
49. The second general category of VTP products is acid etching, where a 
registration number, phone number for a national database, and other information are etched 
with acid onto a vehicle's windows. (Depo. Jason Earl, ROA 1013-1019). 
50. Customers are also provided with window stencils to notify the public that 
etching has been applied and to deter thieves. (Depo. Michelle Davis, ROA 1021-1025). 
51. Although Appellants apply etching to all of their vehicles, only customers who 
pay for the system have their vehicles registered in the national database. (ROA 936). 
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52. If a registered etched car is stolen and recovered, law enforcement officials can 
identify the vehicle's owner by calling the database number and reciting the registration 
number. (Depo. Michelle Davis, ROA 1021-1025). 
53. In some policies, purchasers of the etching system also receive a credit, such 
as $2500 or $5000, toward the purchase of another vehicle if their vehicle is stolen and not 
recovered within thirty days. (Depo. David Griffiths, ROA 1027-1031). 
54. Typically, even if a vehicle is stolen and recovered within the thirty days, the 
customer still receives a credit, such as $1000, toward purchase of another vehicle. (Depo. 
David Griffiths, ROA 1027-1031). 
55. Customers purchasing an etching system can choose how many years of 
coverage to pay for, for instance two, three, or five years. (ROA 937). 
56. Midway sold 234 etch products between 2004 and 2006. (ROA 937). 
57. MRM sold 1155 etch products between 2004 and 2006. (ROA 937). 
58. Customers are provided with written brochures and other information about the 
VTP products sold by both Midway and MRM before deciding whether to purchase the 
products and customers are not required to purchase VTP devices in order to buy the car. 
(Depo. Jason Earl, ROA 1013-1019; Depo. Daniel LePelley, ROA 1033-1035). 
59. The VTP products sold by Appellants were obtained through agents for the 
various product administrators. The agents used by Appellants are Michelle Davis of 
Competitive Dealer Services and David Griffiths of Profit Concepts, Inc. (ROA 937). 
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60. Davis sells her products primarily in Utah and Griffiths sells his products 
throughout Utah and in eighteen other states. (Aff. Michelle Davis, ROA 1038-1040; Aff. 
David Griffiths, ROA 1042-1047). 
61. The VTP products sold by Appellants are well known and accepted in the 
industry. (Amicus Brief, ROA 1066-1114; Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1115 - 1120). 
62. The Utah State Department of Insurance considers VTP products like those 
sold by Midway and MRM to be insurance. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1115-1120). 
63. Both Appellants and their finance managers have "limited lines" insurance 
licenses that allow them to sell the described VTP products. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 
1115 - 1120; Aff Nancy Wilde, ROA 1049-1053; Aff. Camille Wilde, ROA 1055-1059). 
64. A "limited lines" license issued by the Utah State Insurance Department is all 
that is needed to sell VTP products. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1115-1120). 
65. All of the VTP programs offered by Midway and MRM are underwritten by 
insurance companies that are licensed to do business and registered in the state of Utah. (Aff. 
Michelle Davis, ROA 1038-1040; Aff. David Griffiths, ROA 1042-1047). 
66. Appellees' claims related to VTP are based on their alleged violation of Utah 
law, specifically the Utah Insurance Code. (Class Action Second Amended Complaint, ROA 
243-248)7 
GAP Insurance 
67. GAP insurance is a common and accepted insurance product that is offered by 
many automobile dealerships in Utah. (Amicus Brief, ROA 1066-1114). 
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68. In the event of a total loss of the vehicle, a GAP insurance plan, including those 
plans that have the term "waiver" in their title, covers any difference between what the car 
owner's primary insurance company pays and the remaining balance owed to the lender. 
(Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 830-840; Depo. Jason Earl, ROA 731-739; Depo. Daniel 
LePelley, ROA 871-878; Depo. David Griffiths, ROA 900-905). 
69. GAP insurance is regulated by the Utah State Insurance Commission 
("Commission"), which requires those selling GAP Insurance to have a "limited lines" license 
issued by the Commission. (Amicus Brief, ROA1066-1114; Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 
1115-1120). 
70. Administrators and underwriters of GAP insurance must be registered with the 
Commission, and copies of their products' policies must be on file with the Commission 
before the GAP product can be sold in Utah. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1119). 
71. The GAP policies sold by Midway and MRM during all times relevant to this 
action were properly filed with the Commission. (Aff. Michelle Davis, ROA 880-882; Aff. 
David Griffiths, ROA 884-886). 
72. Both Midway and MRM have "limited lines" licenses allowing them to sell 
GAP insurance. (Aff. Nancy Wilde, ROA 888-892; Aff. Camille Wilde, ROA 894-898). 
73. Midway and MRM obtained the GAP products they sold from licensed 
independent third-party dealers and brokers, such as David Griffiths of Profit Concepts, Inc. 
and Michelle Davis of Competitive Dealer Services. (ROA 786). 
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74. The administrators and underwriters of all of the GAP insurance presently or 
previously sold by MRM and Midway are registered with the Commission. (Aff. Michelle 
Davis, ROA 880-882; Aff. David Griffiths, ROA 884-886). 
75. Although each policy is different, typically the administrator of a GAP plan is 
not the underwriter of the coverage, but contracts with one or more insurance companies to 
underwrite the GAP products it administers. (ROA 786). 
76. While some GAP plans were written between Midway or MRM and the 
customer, the administrative responsibilities for these plans are provided by another party and 
indemnity for claims paid is underwritten by insurance companies contracted by the GAP 
product administrator. (ROA 786). 
77. All GAP policies are underwritten by one or more insurance companies. 
(Depo. Daniel LePelley, ROA 871-878). 
78. At MRM, 383 GAP policies were sold during 2004, 461 policies were sold 
during 2005, and 297 policies were sold during 2006; while at Midway, 27 GAP polices were 
sold during 2000,205 during 2001,220 during 2002,237 during 2003,259 during 2004,318 
during 2005, and 277 during 2006. (ROA 787). 
79. At MRM and Midway, GAP policies were sold during the relevant time period 
through several different administrators including Innovative Aftermarket Systems, John F. 
Sutherland and Associates Insurance Services, Inc., Beacon Industries Worldwide, Inc., FLS 
Services, Inc., American Heritage Insurance Services, CU Direct Corporation (also doing 
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business as or in association with Credit Union Direct Lending ("CUDL"), CUNA, and 
Cumis Insurance Society), and Safe-Guard Protection International, Inc. (ROA 787). 
80. At both MRM and Midway, the GAP plans from the different administrators 
varied from year to year. Depending largely on the year and the administrator, the GAP plans 
sold by both MRM and Midway contained different terms, including the maximum term of 
the underlying financing agreement for which the GAP coverage would apply (e.g., 60 
months, 72 months, or 84 months) and the scope of the coverage, including whether the GAP 
policy covered up to 120 percent of the value of the vehicle or up to 150 percent of the value 
of the vehicle. (ROA 788). 
81. At both MRM and Midway, customers could negotiate the price of the GAP 
product, and a customer was not required to purchase GAP in order to purchase the car. 
(ROA 788; Depo. Daniel LePelley, ROA 871-878). 
82. The amount that Appellants could charge for GAP insurance was determined 
by the financial institution with whom the purchaser's financing had been arranged since the 
price of the GAP coverage is typically financed by the customer along with the price of the 
vehicle, and lenders wished to protect their security interest in the vehicle sold. (ROA 788). 
83. Appellees' claims related to GAP are based on their alleged violation of Utah 
law, specifically the Utah Insurance Code. (Class Action Second Amended Complaint, ROA 
248-253). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The District Court erred in denying Appellants' Motion to Dismiss and finding that 
a private right of action exists for an individual to enforce the Utah Insurance Code. 
I-A. The Utah Insurance Code is a regulatory scheme that unambiguously vests power to 
determine Insurance Code violations with the Insurance Commissioner. The entire 
regulatory scheme contained within the Utah Insurance Code must be read together in order 
to properly apply the provisions contained therein. There are no exceptions to the 
Commissioner's authority to determine violations. § 31 A-15-105(2) only allows the recovery 
of insurance premiums in instances where the Insurance Code has been violated. This is 
supported by the legislative history. Accordingly, the trial court does not have jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the VTP and GAP claims being presented by the Appellees. 
I-B. There is no private right of action, express or implied, that supports the Appellees' 
claims. The Insurance Code does not expressly provide for a private right of action. Utah 
courts have considered other provisions of the Insurance Code and determined that a private 
right of action does not exist for those sections. In fact, courts across the country have 
specifically held that no private right of action exists whereby an individual may enforce the 
provisions of an Insurance Code as they relate to the sale of insurance by an 
unauthorized/unlicensed insurer. Where no express private right of action exists, Utah courts 
are properly reluctant to imply a private right of action. 
I-C. An "implied" right of action is inappropriate in light of the regulatory nature of the 
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Insurance Code. The Utah Insurance Code is intended to be enforced through the Insurance 
Department and by its provisions is regulatory in nature. The Insurance Department has 
specialized skill, knowledge and experience in applying the provisions of the Insurance Code 
to those individuals and entities that fall within its authority. Allowing a private citizen to 
circumvent the regulatory scheme by submitting provisions in piecemeal fashion to the courts 
frustrates the purpose of the Insurance Code and the existence of the Insurance Department. 
Appellees should not be allowed to side-step the Insurance Department and regulate the 
insurance industry by way of their lawsuit. 
II. The District Court abused its discretion in certifying the classes because the individual 
classes do not comply with the requirements of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II-A. The Doc Fees classes should not have been certified because the Rule 23 requirements 
have not been met. The Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality are not met 
because there is no common plan or scheme of wrongdoing for any of the Doc Fee claims 
being made. Different Doc Fees were charged over different periods and the work that went 
into a given sale varied from customer to customer. The factual and legal issues vary 
significantly among the representative class members such that any relief granted for one 
class member would likely not apply to most if not all of the other class members. 
Furthermore, the Rule 23(a) adequacy of representation requirement is not met where the 
class representatives are more interested in their individual claims than the class action 
claims, and in many cases are not even aware of, or interested in, the class claims. 
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In addition, Appellees are also unable to satisfy the Rule 23(b) requirements of 
predominance and superiority. Predominance is not met since the class members all have 
divergent interests and experiences. Superiority is not met due to the divergent interests of 
the class members, the fact that the class members already have separate lawsuits wherein 
their actual grievances are being addressed, and the fact that adjudicating the class claims 
being raised will be extraordinarily difficult in light of the varying circumstances of each of 
the class members. 
II-B. The VTP class should also not have been certified because of Rule 23 deficiencies. 
The Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality are not met because there is no 
common plan or scheme of wrongdoing for the VTP claims made. Different VTP products 
were sold to various customers, but none of the class members has alleged any actual failure 
or problem with the VTP product sold. Indeed, the few VTP complaints of the named 
Appellee class members are different and varied and have little to do with VTP. Thus, any 
relief granted for one class member would not apply to most if not all of the other class 
members. Furthermore, the Rule 23(a) adequacy of representation requirement is not met 
where the class members are more interested in their individual claims than the class action 
claims, and in many cases are not even aware or interested in the class claims. 
In addition, the Appellees are also unable to satisfy the Rule 23(b) requirements of 
predominance and superiority. Predominance is not met since the few VTP class members 
have divergent interests and experiences. Superiority is not met due to the class members' 
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divergent interests, the fact that the class members already have separate lawsuits wherein 
their actual grievances are being addressed, and the fact that adjudicating the class claims 
being raised will be very difficult in light of the class members5 divergent circumstances. 
II-C. Finally, the GAP insurance class should not have been certified because the Rule 23 
requirements have not been met. The Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality 
are not met because there is no common plan or scheme of wrongdoing for any of the GAP 
insurance claims being made. GAP insurance is a standard product sold at nearly all car 
dealerships. Although GAP insurance products were sold to various customers, none of the 
class members have alleged any actual problems with the GAP insurance sold. Rather, those 
of the Appellees that even have complaints related to the GAP insurance base their 
complaints on the manner in which the GAP insurance was disclosed to them during their 
automobile purchase rather than on the actual GAP insurance itself. Also, the factual and 
legal issues vary significantly among the representative class members such that any relief 
granted for one class member would likely not apply to most if not all of the other class 
members. Furthermore, the Rule 23(a) adequacy of representation requirement is not met 
where the class members are more interested in their individual claims than the class action 
claims, and in many cases are not even aware or interested in the class claims. 
In addition, the Appellees are also unable to satisfy the Rule 23(b) requirements of 
predominance and superiority. Predominance is not met since the GAP class members have 
divergent interests and experiences. Superiority is not met due to the class members' 
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divergent interests, the fact that the class members already have separate lawsuits wherein 
their actual grievances are being addressed, and the fact that adjudicating the class claims 
being raised will be very difficult in light of the class members' divergent circumstances. 
Because neither the Rule 23(a) nor 23(b) requirements have been met for the Doc 
Fees, VTP and GAP classes, the trial court abused its discretion in certifying these classes. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A PRIVATE RIGHT 
OF ACTION EXISTS UNDER THE UTAH INSURANCE CODE. 
The district court should have dismissed Appellees' claims relating to GAP and VTP. 
Appellees have alleged that by selling Vehicle Theft and GAP Insurance Policies, Appellants 
have violated various provisions of the Utah Insurance Code. Indeed, all of Appellees' 
claims related to Appellants' sale of VTP and GAP products assert violations of the Utah 
Insurance Code. The Utah Insurance Code is regulatory in nature and does not expressly 
provide for a private right of action. Utah courts are very reluctant to infer a private right of 
action where, as here, the Legislature could have granted such and failed to do so. Therefore, 
since Appellees cannot directly maintain these causes of action for Appellants' alleged 
violation of the Insurance Code, the District Court erred in failing to dismiss these claims. 
A- The District Court's Ruling Finding a Private Right of Action Contradicts 
§ 31A-2-201 and Abrogates the Authority of the Insurance Department. 
The power of enforcement for any alleged Insurance Code violation exclusively rests 
with the Insurance Commissioner. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-201(l) unambiguously states 
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that "[t]he commissioner shall administer and enforce this title." The Insurance Code does 
not authorize the courts to determine Insurance Code violations, but instead requires that 
"ftjhe commissioner shall inquire into violations of this title...to determine: (a) whether or 
not any person has violated any provision of this title; or (b) to secure information useful 
in the lawful administration of this title. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-201 (6) (emphasis added). 
There are no exceptions to the Commissioner's authority to determine violations. In 
fact, the Commissioner has an ongoing duty to examine and review licensed insurers and 
their businesses to ensure compliance with the code. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-203 
(2008). Furthermore, the Commissioner is required to comply with the provisions of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act codified under Title 63G in enforcing the regulatory 
scheme created by the code. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-203.5 (2008). The Insurance 
Code must be read and interpreted as a whole and harmonized with the section of the code 
being cited by the Appellees as justifying their class action insurance claims. 
In this case, the auto dealer Appellants engaged in the standard industry business 
practices of selling GAP insurance and VTP products to automobile purchasers who 
requested these products. Appellees allege, without basis, that Appellants were not 
authorized to sell these regulated products. In fact, Appellants possessed "limited lines 
certificates" commonly held for this purpose. Appellees specifically claimed a private right 
of action under Utah Code § 31A-15-105(2), which states: 
"An insurance policy entered into in violation of this chapter is voidable by 
the policyholder who entered into the transaction without knowing it was 
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illegal. The policyholder may avoid the contract by notice to the insurer if no 
insured has enforced the contract by an action under [31 A-15-105(1)], and may 
recover any consideration paid under the contract." (Emphasis added). 
In its July 30, 2008 ruling on Appellants' Motion to Dismiss, the district court found 
that a "private right of action" exists pursuant to § 31 A-15-105, and held that it therefore has 
jurisdiction to determine whether Appellants were "unauthorized insurers" under the 
Insurance Code. The Court relied on § 31A-15-101(2), which states that one of the purposes 
of Chapter 15 is to "subject the unauthorized insurers and other powers doing an insurance 
business in Utah to the jurisdiction of the Utah commissioner and the courts." The court also 
heavily relied onSurety Underwriters v. E.C. Trucking, 10 P.3d 338 (Utah2000), statingthat 
in Surety Underwriters: "an individual was able to seek relief from the courts under 
subsection (1) of the same statute that is the basis of the plaintiffs' claims in this case." (July 
30, 2008 Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss). 
The Court originally held that "[i]f an individual has a right to seek relief from the 
courts under subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-105, it is reasonable that an 
individual would also be able to seek relief from the courts under subsection (2) of that 
statute." Id. Later, however, the Court admitted that it had "misapplied" the analysis of 
Surety Underwriters stating that: 
"[cjontrary to the Court's ruling, the trial court in that case was not ruling on 
whether a party had a right of action under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-105(1). 
Instead, the trial court only ruled that because the insurance company was not 
licensed in Utah, the defendant had a valid affirmative defense under Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-15-105(1)." 
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See November 7,2008 Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider. (ROA 2193). Surety 
Underwriters is also inapplicable to the instant case on separate grounds.1 
In recognition that Surety Underwriters is inapplicable, the district court's reasoning 
that a private right of action exists under § 31 A-15-105 rested solely upon the court's isolated 
interpretation of the language of § 31 A-15-101(2) which states that "It is the purpose of this 
chapter to...subject unauthorized insurers...to the jurisdiction of the Utah commissioner and 
courts." The district court acknowledged its ruling was thinly supported, and lamented that 
"there is no case law that directly addresses the section cited above [31A-15-105(1)]," and 
that "[it] is possible that the Court's interpretation of the statute is incorrect." Id. 
The district court did not consider or comment on the regulatory nature of the 
Insurance Code, nor did it consider any of the other Code provisions incorporating courts into 
the regulatory scheme that would call into question its interpretation of § 31A-15-101(2). 
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-306 (2008) (Providing for judicial review of 
commissioner determinations). Appellants respectfully submit that the district court erred. 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals have stated that, when 
interpreting a statute, a Utah court: 
"looks first to the statute's plain language to determine the Legislature's intent 
^Surety Underwriters is also inapplicable to the present case because in that case it 
was "undisputed that at the time the parties entered into the insurance contract, [insurer] was 
not licensed to engage in an insurance business in Utah, nor did it have a certificate of 
authority." Surety Underwriters, 2000 UT 71, ^ [40. Hence, there was no dispute that the 
insurer was an unauthorized insurer in violation of Utah's Insurance Act. 
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and purpose. We read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and 
interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and 
related chapters. We follow the cardinal rule that the general purpose, intent 
and purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the parts be interpreted 
as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest object." 
Hansen v. Eyre, 74 P.3d 1182, 1185 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (citing Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 
592 (Utah 2003)). Here, the overall purpose of the "whole" Insurance Code is to regulate 
the insurance industry. As such, § 31A-2-201(6) giving the Commissioner exclusive 
authority to determine violations of the Act, § 31A-15-101(2) subjecting unauthorized 
insurers to jurisdiction of the Commissioner and the courts, and § 31A-15-105(2) giving a 
policyholder the right to recover the cost of a policy sold by an unauthorized insurer, must 
all be interpreted as subsidiary to and harmonious with the Code's manifest object of 
regulating the insurance industry in Utah. 
Whether or not Appellees have a remedy under § 31A-15-105 would only possibly 
become relevant after a finding of a requisite violation. Under § 31A-2-201, only the 
Commissioner is authorized to determine whether or not a person has violated the Insurance 
Code. Section 31A-2-201 is consistent with, not contrary to, §31A-15-101(2). Section31A-
15-101(2) does not state that its purpose is to subject parties alleged to be unauthorized 
insurers to the jurisdiction of the courts to determine whether or not such party is an 
unauthorized insurer. At most, it merely gives the courts jurisdiction over a party that is 
already determined to be an unauthorized insurer by the Commissioner pursuant to § 31A-2-
201. Hence, Appellees' alleged right to recovery under § 31A-15-105 only arises, if at all, 
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after Appellants are found to be unauthorized insurers by the Commissioner. 
The legislative history of Chapter 15 further suggests an intent to limit standing to 
enforce the provisions of this chapter to the Commissioner. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that when a statute is ambiguous, "we use extrinsic interpretive tools such as policy 
and legislative intent to guide our analysis.55 R&R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Guar. Ass'n., 199 P.3d 917, 923 (Utah 2008). In 1985 the Utah Legislature, as part of 
a complete re-codification of the Insurance Code, enacted Chapter 15, Unauthorized Insurers 
and Surplus Lines, to replace Chapter 38, the Unauthorized Insurers Act. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-15-101 et seq. The legislative record surrounding the re-codification project 
includes a statement by the Utah Attorney General's Office to the Insurance Code Task 
Force, in which the culpability of persons who procure illegal contracts is discussed. The 
Memorandum specifically characterizes the "broader reach" of the proposed Code section 
as "an important tool of the Commissioner.'5 (Follow-up Statement to Insurance Code Task 
Force; Re: Chapter 15, Unauthorized Insurers and Surplus Lines, Sep. 3, 19852, attached 
hereto as Addendum B). The statement expresses an intent to "increase judicial efficiency 
and economy by allowing the Commissioner to stand in the shoes of many insureds," thus 
allowing the court to "hear only one action instead of many." Id. 
Comparing the stated purpose of the previous code section to that of the current 
inventory of Bill Drafting and Comment Files from Insurance Code Task Force 
1985-86, Utah State Archives Collection, Series 25137, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 7. 
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enactment is also helpful in interpreting the intent of Chapter 15. As currently stated, the 
purpose of Chapter 15 includes the phrase "subject[ing] unauthorized insurers and other 
persons doing an insurance business to the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner and 
the courts." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-101(2). However, the previous iteration stated as its 
purpose "to subject certain insurers to ^jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner and the 
courts of this state in suits by or on behalf of the state" Utah Code Ann. § 31-38-2 (1974) 
(Repealed 1985, emphasis added). The new language, which includes "other persons doing 
an insurance business," is consistent with the proposal by the Attorney General to provide 
a "broader sweep" and include within the scope of the Chapter persons other than sellers who 
may also be culpable in selling illegal contracts. See Follow-up Statement to Insurance Code 
Task Force, attached as Addendum B. However, nothing in the history suggests that the 
language of the previous act, which expressly subjects insurers only to suits "by or on behalf 
of the state" was intended to be radically modified or altered to provide a new private right 
of action for individuals to determine violations of the Insurance Code. 
Other jurisdictions have specifically held that, under similar statutory schemes, the 
Commissioner alone has the authority to determine violations of the Insurance Code. See, 
e.g., Peterson v. Cellco Partnership, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316, 325 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 2008) ("As 
to this second point, plaintiffs do not contend that a private right of action exists for pertinent 
Insurance Code violations, nor can they. Insurance Code section 1758.65 grants the 
Commissioner the power to enforce the relevant sections of the Insurance Code. A statute 
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creates a private right of action only if the statutory language or legislative history 
affirmatively indicates such an intent.") (Emphasis added, internal quotations omitted). 
Even taking the Appellees5 arguments at face value, when read together with the other 
provisions of the Insurance Code, § 31A-15-105(2) could only possibly provide, at best, a 
limited right to recover the premiums paid for a policy issued by an unauthorized insurer. 
However, this right to reimbursement only ever arises after the Commissioner, not the 
courts, exercises the Commissioner's express statutory authority and makes a determination 
that the policy was issued in violation of the Insurance Code. 
Furthermore, if §31A-15-105(2) is read in harmony with § 31A-15-101(2), even this 
limited right was meant to be enforced through the Insurance Department. The Insurance 
Department would, on behalf of an insured, thereafter also pursue the reimbursement claims 
against violators of the Code in court, thereby preserving the regulatory nature of the 
statutory scheme. This method of enforcement is consistent with the original language of the 
Chapter which was "to subject certain insurers to the jurisdiction of the insurance 
commissioner and the courts of this state in suits by or on behalf of the state." Utah Code 
Ann. § 31-38-2 (1974) (Repealed 1985, emphasis added). 
This is not a case where administrative remedies are insufficient. The Code fully 
provides Appellees with an administrative means to address their claims. Upon finding a 
violation to which § 31A-15-105 provides a remedy, the Commissioner "shall issue 
prohibitory, mandatory, or other orders necessary to secure compliance with this title." Utah 
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Code Ann. § 31A-2-201(4). Appellees have failed to pursue, let alone exhaust, these 
administrative remedies. Only after the exhaustion of this administrative process do the 
courts have jurisdiction over "unauthorized insurers" pursuant to § 31A-15-101(2). 
Otherwise, the described regulatory scheme is for naught, and a party can circumvent the 
Insurance Department's authority to regulate, by asserting an individual's regulatory claims 
in court. 
Because Appellees are alleging that common industry practices actually violate the 
Insurance Code, this is the quintessential case where the Insurance Department, not the 
courts, should decide the issue. The Insurance Department possesses specialized skills and 
knowledge about whether Appellants are an unauthorized insurer under the Code, and is 
therefore better situated than the courts to make such a determination. The Commissioner 
has not had an opportunity to determine whether Appellants violated the Insurance Code with 
regard to their marketing and/or selling of GAP and ATP products. While § 31 A-2-201(6) 
sufficiently places the question of whether or not Appellants were "unauthorized insurers" 
within the sole jurisdiction of the Insurance Department, it is even more critical that this 
matter be decided by the Department, because this determination is certain to regulate 
common industry practices for all automobile dealers in Utah. 
The Court's error in creating a private right of action has allowed Appellees' claims 
to proceed in court, where Appellees' claims should be administratively redressed through 
the Insurance Department. The Court's ruling directly contradicts the Commissioner's 
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express authority to determine violations of the Insurance Code pursuant to § 31 A-2-201 (6), 
and allows Appellees to circumvent the Commissioner's exclusive authority and thereby 
judicially regulate insurance industry contrary to statute and contrary to legislative intent. 
B. There is No Private Right of Action, Express or Implied, that Supports 
Appellees' Claims. 
A private right of action, express or implied, has not been found by Utah courts under 
any section of the Utah Insurance Code. Because the Utah Insurance Code does not 
expressly provide for any private right of action, only an "implied" right, if any, could exist. 
However, "Utah courts have rarely, if ever, found a Utah statute to grant an "implied" private 
right of action." Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 853 (Utah 2004); see also Miller v. 
Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 588-89 (Utah 2003) (citing numerous Utah cases in various statutory 
contexts where private rights of action were not implied and reaffirming reluctance of courts 
to imply a private right of action based on state law); Broadbent v. Bd. ofEduc, 910 P.2d 
1274, 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("the courts of this state are not generally in the habit of 
implying a private right of action based upon state law, absent some specific direction from 
the Legislature."). 
Utah courts have not specifically addressed whether a private right of action exists 
under § 31 A-2-201. However, the Utah Supreme Court has considered this question under 
other regulatory insurance provisions and has uniformly found that a private right of action 
does not exist in these contexts. 
For instance, in Machan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 116 P,3d 342 (Utah 2005), the 
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appellee asserted that the court should imply a private right of action under§ 31 A-26-301 of 
the Insurance Code, which governs timely payment of insurance claims. Id. The court 
disagreed and reasoned that this section of the Insurance Code regulated the professional 
duties of insurance adjusters and did not create a private right of action. Id. at 347-48. The 
court noted that a related section of the Code governing unfair claims settlement practices 
explicitly stated that it "did not create any private cause of action." Id. The court then made 
the general observation that "in the absence of statutory language expressly indicating a 
legislative intent to grant a private right of action, Utah courts are reluctant to recognize an 
implied right" and thus disallowed "a private cause of action by an insured against an 
insurer," under that section of the Insurance Code. Id. 
Other Utah decisions have reached the same conclusion. See Saleh v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch, 133 P.3d 428, 436 (Utah 2006) (citing Machan and stating that "this court recently 
held that Utah Code § 31 A-26-301 [of the Insurance Code] does not allow a private right 
cause of action by an insured against an insurer"); Cannon v. Travelers Indent. Co., 994 P.2d 
824, 828-29 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (holding that unfair insurance claims practices in Utah 
Code § 31A-26-303 did not create private cause of action). It would be unprecedented to 
allow Appellees' private claims for violation of the Insurance Code to proceed. Appellees 
have failed to cite any express statutory authority permitting them to bring such claims. The 
relevant Supreme Court holdings are clear in denying private rights of action in connection 
with other sections of the Insurance Code. 
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Other jurisdictions, when considering this same issue under similar statutory schemes, 
have, consistent with Utah, also held there is no private right of action for the violation of 
selling insurance without a license. See, e.g., American Auto. Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 812 
So.2d 309, 312 (Ala. 2001) (holding that there is no private right of action for party alleging 
violation of selling insurance without a license); Peterson v. Cellco Partnership, 164 
Cal.App.4th 1583,1595,80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316,325 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 2008) (holding that there 
is no private right of action for unlicensed sale of cellular phone insurance policies); Van 
Zanen v. Qwest Wireless, L.L.C, 550 F.Supp.2d 1261 (D. Colo. 2007), affd Van Zanen v. 
Qwest Wireless, L.L. C., 522 F.3d 1127 (1 Oth Cir. 2008) (holding that there is no private right 
of action for unlicensed sale of insurance for wireless telephone equipment). 
C- It is Error to Imply a Private Right of Action When a Statutory Scheme 
Is Regulatory in Nature. 
Utah Courts are reluctant to imply private rights of action in the context of a 
regulatory statutory scheme. See e.g. Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 994 P.2d 824 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2000) (stating that Rule 590-89-3 of the Administrative Code is "is regulatory in 
nature and is not intended to create a private right of action."); Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 
598-599 (Utah 2003) ("In the absence of language expressly granting aprivate right of action 
in the statute itself, the courts of this state are reluctant to imply a private right of action 
based on state law"). This policy avoids inconsistent and unauthorized judicial regulation 
when conduct is already aggressively regulated under statutory authority by an agency that 
possesses specialized skills and knowledge. See Miller, 66 P.3d at 599 ("This reluctance [to 
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imply a private right of action] is particularly strong when the Legislature has already 
designated a method of resolution through an administrative agency specifically empowered 
to handle issues." Emphasis added). 
It is undeniable that the Utah Insurance Code is regulatory in nature. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-1-102 states that the "purposes of the Insurance Code are to . . . (5) encourage 
cooperation between the Insurance Department and other Utah regulatory bodies, as well 
as other federal and state governmental entities; (6)preserve and improve State regulation 
of insurance; ... (8) encourage self regulation of the insurance industry." Id. (Emphasis 
added). Furthermore, similar to other regulatory entities, the Commissioner has an ongoing 
duty to examine and review licensed insurers and their businesses to ensure compliance with 
the Code and is required to comply with the provisions of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act in doing so. See Utah Code Ann. §31A-2-203 (2008); Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-2-203.5(2008). 
Because Utah's Insurance Department has both the statutory authority and specialized 
expertise to regulate the insurance industry in Utah, it is improper to imply a private right of 
action to enforce Utah's Insurance Code where it is squarely regulatory in nature. Moreover, 
because the practices that Appellees allege to be violations of Utah's Insurance Code are 
common industry practices, it is highly improper to allow Appellees to side-step the 
Commissioner unilaterally in an attempt to regulate and reform the insurance industry by way 
of this lawsuit. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S CERTIFICATION OF THE DOCUMENTARY 
SERVICE FEES, VTP, AND GAP CLASSES WAS IMPROPER. 
Under Utah law, "the trial court may certify a class only if, after rigorous analysis, it 
determines that the proposed class satisfies the prerequisites of [Rule] 23(a)." JB. exrel Hart 
v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280,1287-88 (10th Cir. 1999)3. In seeking certification, Appellees have 
the burden of establishing that certification is proper. See Ditty v. Check Rite, Ltd., 182 
F.RD. 639, 641 (D.Utah 1998). 
A* The legal standard for certification under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Utah Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides four requirements for 
certification: 
"One or more members of a class may sue ... as representative parties on 
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) 
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 23(a). Appellees, as class plaintiffs, must demonstrate that all four 
requirements -numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation- are 
satisfied. See Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1988). 
3Since the language of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is nearly identical 
to the language of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah courts looks to 
federal case law for guidance. See Oakwood VilL, L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, 
1231 (Utah 2004) ("Where, as here, there is almost no case law interpreting the Utah rule and 
the Utah and federal rules are identical, we freely resort to federal law as a useful guide.55). 
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First, with regard to the numerosity requirement, although generally left to the court's 
discretion, "there must be presented some evidence of established, ascertainable numbers 
constituting the class in order to satisfy even the most liberal interpretation of the numerosity 
requirement." Rex v. Owens9 585 F.2d 432, 436 (10th Cir.1978). 
Next, the commonality requirement "is met if [P]laintiffsf grievances share a common 
question of law or of fact." JB. ex rel Hart, 186 F.3d at 1288. If a defendant has engaged 
in a common plan, scheme, or course of conduct that "affects a group of persons and gives 
rise to a cause of action, one or more of the elements of that cause of action will be common 
to all of the persons affected'' Rugumbwa v. Betten Motor Sales, 200 F.R.D. 358,361 (W.D. 
Mich. 2001) (Emphasis added). 
Third, typicality requires the claims of the class representatives to be typical of those 
of the potential class. "Typicality determines whether a sufficient relationship exists between 
the injury to the named [Plaintiffs] and the conduct affecting the class, so that the court may 
properly attribute a collective nature to the challenged conduct." Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 167 
F.R.D. 147,160 (D. Kan. 1996) (quoting 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 3.13, at 3-76). Like 
commonality, a plaintiffs claim is "typical" if "it arises from the same event or practice or 
course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims 
are based on the same legal theory." Id. (Emphasis added). 
Finally, adequacy or representation requires that the class representatives' interests 
be aligned with those of the putative class. "[A] class representative must be part of the class 
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and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as class members." Amchem Prods. 
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997) (Emphasis added). Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the 
plaintiffs provide "fair and adequate protection for the interests of the class." Ditty v. Check 
Rite, Ltd., 182 F.R.D. 639 (D.Utah 1998). "Two factors are important in that determination: 
(1) the class attorney's qualifications, experience, and ability to conduct the litigation and (2) 
whether the named plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to those of the class." Id. (Emphasis 
added). 
Rule 23(b) contains additional requirements for class certification. Under Rule 
23(b)(3), in addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a), Appellees must also show 
that "questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members" and that "a class action is superior to other 
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Utah R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3); see also Ditty, 182 F.R.D. at 643. 
"At its essence, predominance is concerned with whether the putative named 
Appellees can, through their individualized cases, offer proof on a class-wide basis." Hyderi 
v. Washington Mutual Bank, 235 F.R.D. 390, 398 (N.D. 111. 2006) (Emphasis added) (citing 
Hewitt v. Joyce Beverages of Wise, Inc., 721 F.2d 625, 628-629 (7th Cir. 1983)). The 
predominance inquiry "tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation." Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 623. Predominance is "far 
more demanding" than the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a). Id. 
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In establishing the superiority requirement, Appellees must demonstrate that a class 
action is "superior to, and not just as good as other available methods for handling the 
controversy." Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 91 F.R.D. 440,444 (D. Ore. 1983). 
Courts use four factors to analyze this requirement of "superiority": (A) the interests of 
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; [and] (D) the difficulties 
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
The evidence presented clearly establishes that Appellees' classes for Doc Fees, VTP 
and GAP insurance do not meet the requirements of certification under Rule 23. As such, 
the district court abused its discretion in certifying Appellees' various classes. 
B. Certification of the Doc Fees classes was improper. 
In their Motion for Certification for the Doc Fees classes, Appellees contended that 
Appellants violate "every" Utah law governing Doc Fees. Appellees allege Appellants 
violate (1) the Utah Unfair Practices Act ( Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-1, et seq.) by charging 
Doc Fees that exceed the actual cost to the Appellants; (2) the Utah Motor Vehicle Act (Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-3-210(l)(a)) by failing to include Doc Fees in alleged "advertisements" or 
written offers to sell vehicles; (3) the Utah Administrative Code R877-23 V-14, by failing to 
segregate Doc Fees from "state mandated fees"; (4) the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division 
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regulations (Utah Administrative Code R877-23V-14), by failing to display or prominently 
display signs explaining Doc Fees; and (5) the Uniform Commercial Code covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. None of these causes of action is appropriate for class certification as 
they do not meet the requirements of Rule 23. 
1. Class certification was improper because Appellees cannot meet the 
Commonality, Typicality and Adequacy of Representation requirements 
of Rule 23(a). 
The trial court abused its discretion in certifying the Doc Fees classes since three of 
the four Rule 23(a) requirements are not met SeeReedv.Bowen, 849F.2d 1307,1310 (10th 
Cir. 1988) (must show requirements numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation are each met). 
a. Lack of commonality and typicality. 
The trial court committed reversible error in certifying the Doc Fees classes because 
Appellees have failed to show a common plan or scheme of wrongdoing and because the 
factual and legal questions of the Appellees vary according to each individual transaction 
with Appellants. 
1. Absence of a common plan or scheme. 
Appellees have alleged that Appellants engaged in a common plan or scheme by 
charging Doc Fees in violation of Utah law. Appellees allege that the Doc Fees charged by 
Appellants are unlawful under one or more of the following circumstances: (1) where the 
Doc Fee charged exceeds the actual cost to the dealership; (2) where the state-required Doc 
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Fee sign is not displayed; (3) where the Fee is not included in the advertised price of a 
vehicle; and/or (4) where the dealership falsely implied that the Doc Fee was a state-
mandated fee. 
The charging of Doc Fees is an accepted and common practice in the Utah auto 
industry. Charging a fee that is expressly permitted by state law is not a plan, scheme, or 
even a course of conduct giving rise to a cause of action. Appellees merely allege that the 
Doc Fees charged are "unlawful." Appellees essentially admit to no common plan or scheme 
because they provide four different sets of circumstances that allegedly could give rise to a 
cause of action. 
For example, Appellees contend that Appellants schemed to omit Doc Fees from the 
"advertised price," which they then construe to refer to the "pencil offer," of the vehicle. 
Appellees do not allege that Appellants plotted to produce television or newspaper 
• advertisements that failed to disclose the Doc Fees, or that any particular training, manual, 
or policy at either MRM or Midway required salespeople to deceive purchasers about Doc 
Fees. Appellees allege only that when a "pencil" was used, it did not include the Doc Fees. 
Even assuming this allegation is true, "pencils" were not used in every case, and even when 
they were used, the price of the car on a "pencil" was often followed by a notation that tax, 
license, and fees, were to be added to the price. Moreover, a "pencil" is nothing more than 
a negotiating worksheet, and is neither an "advertisement" for the vehicle in question nor a 
binding contract. Thus, many different scenarios played out during each individual 
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transaction, depending on the purchaser, salesperson, and general manager involved. 
By way of further example, Appellees also allege that Appellants' Motor Vehicle 
Contract of Sale falsely implies that Doc Fees are state-mandated. This is likewise not a 
scheme, or course of conduct. The contract used by Midway and MRM, including the 
placement of the Doc Fees line, is similar or identical to forms used by most other 
dealerships in the State of Utah. Had Appellees alleged that Appellants took this form and 
altered the language or changed the placement of the Doc Fee line, a common "plan of 
deception" may have at least been argued. However, no such allegations were or could 
reasonably be made. Appellees therefore have not alleged a common plan, scheme, or course 
of conduct, and the Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality cannot be met. 
2. An individualized inquiry into each purchaser's claim is 
required. 
The experiences of the Appellees are not similar, or common, to each other, much less 
typical of the entire putative class of purchasers. Thus, this issue is unsuitable for class 
treatment because of the factual variances inherent in the each Appellee's experience with 
Doc Fees. If certification is upheld on appeal, this case will "devolve into a series of 
individual trials on issues peculiar to each plaintiff" Zapata, 167F.R.D. at 166. Each of the 
four claims of "wrongful conduct" alleged by Appellees would require a series of 
individualized questions about each transaction. 
Claim No. 1: "Doc Fee exceeds actual cost to dealership." 
Appellees have acknowledged that Appellants and most other car dealers in the state 
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charge Doc Fees for preparing and processing documents and registering and titling the 
vehicle in the name of the buyer. (ROA 569). The Doc Fee also covers the cost of 
submitting a credit application signed by the purchaser to one or more financial institutions. 
(ROA 1066-1114). To examine the claim that Appellants charged a Doc Fee in excess of 
actual costs (i.e. constituted a "profit"), in addition to the initial inquiry as to whether making 
a profit is improper, the Court would also have to consider the factual circumstances of each 
individual Appellee to answer questions such as: What was the amount of the Doc Fee 
charged? When was the Doc Fee charged? How much paperwork was involved in the 
individual transaction? How many employees were involved in processing the paperwork and 
what were they paid for this work? Did the purchaser trade in a vehicle? Did the purchaser 
require that Midway or MRM obtain financing for the purchaser? What was involved in the 
registration and titling process of the individual car? How much time was involved in 
processing the transaction? What were Midway's and MRM's costs of the above at the time 
of the particular transaction? The answers to these questions vary from purchase to purchase 
and therefore need to be asked on an individual basis. This is not proper in a class action. 
Claim No. 2: "State-required sign is not displayed," 
Appellees assert that the Doc Fees are illegal because the state-mandated signs are not 
displayed or not displayed "prominently," in violation of state regulations. To determine 
whether this was the case in each of the transactions at issue, the Court would have to ask 
each individual Appellee questions such as: Did you enter into, and/or sign, contracts in the 
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Finance and Insurance Office of either Midway or MRM? Did you sign contracts in any other 
location? Did you see the Doc Fees sign or signs in those offices? Did you see the signs in 
any other location at either dealership? The answers given by the class representatives are 
unlikely to be the same answers given by putative class members. 
Claim No. 3: "The Doc Fee is not included in the advertised price 
of the vehicle." 
Appellees further complain that the Doc Fee is not included in the "pencil offer" for 
sale of the vehicle. Even assuming that the "pencil offer" could be considered an 
"advertisement" (which Appellants deny), to determine whether this claim is viable the Court 
would have to engage in the following individualized inquiries: Who was the salesperson and 
general manager in your transaction? What did the "pencil" negotiations worksheets look 
like in your case? Did you sign the worksheet? Did the worksheet note that tax, license, and 
fees would be added to the supposedly offered price? What did the "pencil" say in particular 
and did it mention Doc fees? What did you understand the "pencil" to be? The answers to 
these, and related, inquiries will not be common as to all class members. 
Claim No. 4: "Appellants implied doc fee was state-mandated." 
This claim would also require individualized questions, such as: What did your 
contract look like? Where was the Doc Fee placed in your contract? Did you read the 
contract? What did you believe the fee to be? Did the salesperson or others make any 
statements stating or implying that the fee was state-mandated? Did you understand the Doc 
Fee to be state-mandated? 
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The tedious and time-consuming nature of all of these individualized inquiries defeats 
any utility that the class action method would provide. The Court need look no further than 
the varying circumstances in which the Appellees were charged Doc Fees to ascertain that 
this case is inappropriate for certification. See Brooks v. S. Bell Tel & Tel Co., 133 F.R.D. 
54, 57 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("Even among the eleven class representatives there exists little 
commonality of fact. Clearly, there is even less commonality of fact among the proposed 
5,000 plus class members."). 
A cursory look at only two of the class representatives illustrates the lack of 
commonality and typicality among even the named Appellees. For example, at one end of 
the spectrum is the complicated transaction involving Appellee Dalton Jaques, who 
purchased a 2001 Toyota from Midway in August 2004. He signed an initial contract, but 
later returned to the dealership and signed a superseding second contract with terms generally 
more favorable to him. Mr. Jaques initially represented that he would have $15,000 to put 
down on the vehicle, but that down payment did not materialize and was not included in the 
second set of contracts. Mr. Jaques did not have a vehicle to trade in. Multiple sets of 
paperwork were processed. Midway arranged financing for Mr. Jaques, and multiple lenders 
were contacted. Mr. Jaques was charged a Doc Fee of $299.95. The time spent documenting 
the Jaques transaction was substantial 
At the other end of the spectrum are the more simple dealings with Appellee Gregory 
Heiner who, along with his son, purchased a 2003 Acura from Midway in June 2003. He 
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visited Midway one time and signed one contract. Mr. Heiner did not trade anything in. He 
put $1500 down, arranged his own financing, and delivered a check for the vehicle's 
purchase price directly to the dealership. He was charged a Doc Fee of $289.95. 
These examples illustrate that the Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and 
typicality are not met in this case and that even if the named Appellees were granted some 
relief by the Court, that relief could not automatically apply to all members of the class 
because of their disparate and individualized circumstances. 
b. Appellees do not meet the Adequacy of Representation 
requirement of Rule 23(a), 
Appellees are not adequate representatives because their interests are not aligned with 
those of the putative class. "[A] class representative must be part of the class and possess the 
same interest and suffer the same injury as class members." Amchem Prods, v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591,625-26 (1997). Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the plaintiffs provide "fair and adequate 
protection for the interests of the class." Ditty, 182 F.R.D. at 642. "Two factors are important 
in that determination: (1) the class attorney's qualifications, experience, and ability to conduct 
the litigation and (2) whether the named plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to those of the 
class." Id. (emphasis added). Appellees assert that this requirement is met by their counsel's 
experience and ability in conducting class action litigation. While this may be the case, 
Appellees fail to address the interests of the named Appellees in relation to the putative class, 
the second required factor. An examination of the named Appellees' depositions raises 
serious doubts about the adequacy of representation. 
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Appellees' interests are antagonistic to those of the putative class members for varying 
reasons. Importantly, several of the named Appellees, such as Jodi Poll Holbrook and 
Gregory Heiner, affirmatively stated that they have no objection to Appellants' practice of 
charging Doc Fees. Such statements are directly antagonistic to putative class members who 
claim that Appellants charge Doc Fees in violation of "every" relevant Utah law. Cf Zapata 
v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147, 168 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that adequacy of representation 
requirement was not satisfied because plaintiff requested to be placed in certain job position, 
which created an "inherent conflict of interest" with putative class members who claimed 
they were discriminated against when they were assigned to same job position). 
Other Appellees, such as Dalton Jaques and Elisha Dela Garza, are only interested in 
their own claims. These Appellees stated that their only concern is recovering money they 
allegedly lost by doing business with Appellants. This is antagonistic to the interests of 
putative class members who need someone who is aware that there are other potential 
members of the class, and who would be willing to seek a different, class-wide form of relief 
as requested by the Complaint. 
Finally, when asked to describe why they were unhappy with Appellants, most of the 
Appellees did not complain about Appellants' practice of charging Doc Fees. In fact, one 
Appellee, Melissa Thomas, tellingly stated: "I do not know what a dealer documentary fee 
is." (Depo. Melissa Thomas, ROA 759). Class members will not be protected by Appellees 
who know nothing about Doc Fees and have never complained about them. See, e.g., Asbury 
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Automotive Group, Inc. v. Palasack, 237 S.W.3d462,465 (Ark. 2006) (named plaintiff was 
adequate representative because he "conducted his own research as to the legitimacy" of a 
dealership's practice of charging Doc Fees before deciding to become a class representative). 
Dalton Jaques is an inadequate class representative because he does not understand 
what acting as a class representative entails. He testified in his deposition that he is only 
concerned about his own claims, not the claims of the class. (ROA 1455). 
Severo Rodriguez is an inadequate class representative because he did not complain 
about being charged Doc Fees. He testified that his allegations against Midway relate to 
Midway incorrectly filling out documents. 
Elisha Dela Garza has no understanding of what being a class representative entails, 
has no desire to act as a plaintiff in this case, and is only interested in recovering the money 
she believes she lost. (ROA 1458-59). When asked why she was unhappy with Midway, Ms. 
Dela Garza explained her allegation that Midway falsified information about her grandfather 
on the sales contract and sold her a four-cylinder vehicle instead of a six-cylinder vehicle. 
Ms. Dela Garza never mentioned being upset about Doc Fees. Id. 
Nicholas Rodarte is an inadequate representative because he does not possess the 
same interest as the other Appellees. Although he stated in his deposition that he was upset 
about Doc Fees, he did not say he was upset for any of the reasons asserted by Appellees. 
Rather, Mr. Rodarte alleged that the Doc Fee was not disclosed to him and if it had been 
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disclosed, he would not have sued over the Doc Fee4. (ROA 764-765) 
Jodi Poll Holbrook cannot adequately represent the putative class because she has no 
problem with Appellants'practice ofcharging Doc Fees. (ROA 1327-1328). Ms.Holbrook's 
complaints against Appellants do not involve charging Doc Fees. (ROA 1327-1328) 
Melissa Thomas described various grievances she had with the Appellants, but never 
complained about being charged a Doc Fee. In fact, when asked whether she personally had 
any objection to a dealership charging a Doc Fee, Ms. Thomas answered, "I do not know 
what a dealer documentary fee is." (ROA 759). 
Gregory Heiner cannot adequately represent the putative class because he has no 
problem with Appellants' practice ofcharging a Doc Fee. (ROA 1331-32). 
As outlined above, the deposition testimony of the class representatives demonstrates 
their inadequacy to serve as class representatives. 
2. Class certification was improper because Appellees cannot meet the 
Predominance and Superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), 
The district court erred in certifying the Doc Fees classes because Appellees failed to 
show that "questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members" and that "a class action is superior to other 
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Utah R, Civ. P. 
23(b)(3). 
4It should be noted that the Doc Fee was clearly listed and identified as such on the 
sales contract Mr. Rodarte signed. (ROA 764-765). 
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a. The Predominance Requirement was not met because common 
questions of law and fact are not present and therefore do not 
predominate. 
Appellees cannot meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), because MRM 
and Midway did not engage in a common plan or scheme, and individualized inquiries would 
have to be made into each Appellee's experience with Doc Fees and how the Doc Fee 
charged at the time related to the dealer's costs at the time. Because commonality is not 
demonstrated, the requirement of predominance is not met. Class certification was thus 
improper. 
b. The Superiority Requirement was not met because the named 
Appellees are interested only in their individual claims, and a class 
action would be unmanageable. 
An examination of the first two of the four "superiority" factors of Rule 23 shows that 
superiority has not been met in this case. A court considering the "interests of individual 
members in controlling their own cases" must "inform itself of any litigation actually pending 
by ... the individuals." Wilcox, 97 F.R.D. at 444. In their initial Class Action Amended 
Complaint, Appellees asserted twenty-five individual causes of action apart from the class 
claims. The Stipulated Case Management Order severed those individual claims from the 
class claims. Thus, Appellees already have litigation pending in the trial court on their 
numerous individual causes of action. These cases will proceed regardless of whether the 
class claims are certified and they arise out of the same transactions as the class claims, 
Importantly, as demonstrated by the deposition testimony, Appellees have a strong interest 
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in pursuing their own claims in the severed individual actions. By contrast, they lack a 
substantial interest in or knowledge about the class claims and have no idea what serving as 
a class representative entails. When asked to describe their grievances against Midway or 
MRM, they describe their unique individual experiences. When asked why they are suing, 
the deposed Appellees generally did not express concerns over the class claims related to Doc 
Fees. Appellees1 ignorance of class grievances demonstrates that this putative class action is 
nothing more than an attempt to cobble together unrelated consumer claims and experiences 
in an effort to reform the automobile industry. The superiority factor is thus not satisfied. 
Finally, the management of this class action will prove very difficult, further 
precluding Appellees from meeting the superiority requirement. Appellees' first class-those 
who purchased cars from Midway-consists of approximately 4262 members; Appellees' 
second class-those who purchased cars from MRM-consists of 2250 members. Examining 
Appellees' claims would require individualized inquiries into the peculiar circumstances of 
each Doc Fee charged. In addition, Appellees seek monetary damages in the amount 
wrongfully charged for Doc Fees. These damages, even if proven, will not be the same for 
every purchaser. The amount of the Doc Fee paid varied according to the time period in 
which the vehicle was purchased. More importantly, the amount of the Doc Fee that was 
allegedly in excess of the actual cost to the dealership would necessarily vary from person 
to person, depending on whether the sale involved a trade-in, involved the dealership 
obtaining financing, involved more than one set of paperwork, and so on. In Call v. City of 
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W Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183-84 (Utah 1986) the court held that a class action was 
uncertifiable because "judicial economy would be little served because the amount of the 
claim of each class member would still need to be determined on an individual basis, 
regardless of class action status," See also Wilcox, 97 F.R.D. at 445 (noting that in analyzing 
manageability factor, f'[t]he court should consider whether damages can be proved by 
calculations based on a mathematical formula or whether individualized proof of injury and 
damages will be required"). Individualized considerations for more than 6,500 car 
purchasers render this class action unmanageable. This Court should reverse the trial court 
and, like the court in Call, rule that the Doc Fee classes are uncertifiable, 
C. Certification of VTP classes was improper 
Appellees assert essentially three arguments relating to the VTP products: (I) that the 
VTP products sold by Midway and MRM are "insurance" under Utah law, (2) that the 
dealerships are not authorized to sell these insurance policies, and (3) that VTP policies sold 
by Midway and MRM promise monetary benefits from an entity that is not approved as an 
insurer in the state of Utah. None of these contentions is appropriate for class certification. 
First, certification is inappropriate because the proposed classes do not meet the Rule 23(a) 
requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Second, 
certification is inappropriate because common issues do not predominate over individual 
issues, and a class action is not the superior method for resolving these disputes. 
L Class Certification was improper because Appellees cannot meet the 
Commonality, Typicalitv, and Adequacy of Representation requirements 
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of Rule 23(a). 
The trial court abused its discretion in certifying the VTP classes since Appellees 
failed to meet three of the four Rule 23(a) requirements. 
a. Lack of Commonality and Typicality. 
Neither commonality nor typicality are met on the facts of this case. Appellees' 
Complaint fails to adequately plead a common plan or scheme of wrongdoing with regard 
to the sale of VTP products. In addition, these proposed classes are not certifiable because 
the factual and legal questions of the Appellees vary according to each individual transaction 
with Appellants. 
1. Absence of a Common Plan or Scheme. 
Appellees make the conclusory allegation that Appellants engaged in wrongful 
conduct by selling promises to indemnify the car buyer for the risk of auto theft without 
having to comply with the consumer protections provided in the Utah Insurance Code. (ROA 
524). This allegation has no factual basis and is actually contrary to the facts developed 
during the first phase of discovery. Appellees devoted much of time at the trial court level 
arguing that VTP products are insurance. This is a red herring. Even assuming VTP products 
are 'insurance/' Appellants still did not engage in a common plan or scheme giving rise to 
a cause of action by selling these policies. At all times relevant to this action, Midway, 
MRM, and their finance managers had "limited lines" insurance licenses that allowed them 
to sell these VTP products. Furthermore, the monetary benefits promised in the VTP 
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programs were underwritten by qualified insurers licensed in Utah. Agents for the policy 
administrators sell these same policies to dealerships throughout Utah and in eighteen 
surrounding states. 
In their certification Motion, Appellees analogized this case to Roy Veal v. Crown 
Auto Dealerships, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 572 (M.D. Fla. 2006) and Violette v. PA, Days, Inc., 214 
F.R.D. 207 (S.D. Ohio 2003). In both of these cases, the court certified class actions relating 
to complaints about the defendants' standard procedures involved in selling VTP products. 
These cases, however, are different from this case because they involve allegations that the 
defendants engaged in deception and misrepresentation as a general policy in the sale of the 
products. 
In Roy Veal, for instance, the named plaintiff alleged that the car dealership "routinely 
failed to make adequate disclosures concerning the sale of the product,... misled customers 
as to the true benefit [the VTP product] provided, [and] failed to specify the premium paid 
for the 'Etch' 6 product," 236 F.R.D. at 575-76. Similarly, in Violette, the named plaintiff 
alleged that the car dealership automatically, and without disclosure to the customer, imposed 
a charge for the VTP product with every automobile sale. 214 F.R.D. at 211,214. 
By contrast, in this case Appellees have not alleged, nor could they allege, a common 
plan or scheme of this sort. As demonstrated by the many named Appellees who did not have 
a charge imposed for a VTP product-e.g., Elisha Dela Garza, Severo Rodriguez, Jodi Poll 
Holbrook, Melissa Thomas, and Gregory Heiner- Midway and MRM do not have a policy 
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or practice of automatically charging for VTP. Nor do Appellants fail to disclose the price 
of VTP, as evidenced by the Motor Vehicle Contracts of Sale that clearly lists a price for any 
VTP product purchased. Nor do Appellees allege that there were misrepresentations or 
deceit in the way the VTP products were sold. Appellants simply sold common and accepted 
VTP products to customers who wanted them, and were authorized to offer these products 
by their "limited lines" insurance license. In addition, the products sold by MRM and 
Midway were underwritten by insurance companies authorized to conduct business in Utah. 
Appellees therefore have not alleged a common plan, scheme, or course of conduct giving 
rise to a cause of action, and for this reason alone the Rule 23(a) requirements of 
commonality and typicality are not met. 
2. An Individualized Inquiry Into Each Plaintiffs Claim Is 
Required* 
No issues of fact are common to all class members. While it is true that all the 
proposed class members purchased VTP products, it is not true that all class members 
purchased the same type of VTP product involving the same administrator with the same 
underwriter. If certification is upheld on appeal, this case will "devolve into a series of 
individual trials on issues peculiar to each [P]laintiff.n Zapata, 167 F.R.D. at 166. Appellees 
contend that the dealerships are not authorized to sell VTP "insurance" policies and that VTP 
policies promise monetary benefits from entities that are not approved as insurers in the state 
of Utah. 
Even assuming that these arguments merit further investigation, that investigation 
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would require examination of each of the approximately 1700 sales of VTP and this 
examination would involve a series of individualized questions for each Plaintiff because the 
VTP products, contracts, terms, administrators, and underwriters varied from year to year. 
Thus, to determine whether each product was legally sold, the following must be determined: 
(A) Which type of VTP product was purchased? (B) From which dealership was it 
purchased? (C) In what year was the VTP product purchased? (D) Who was the administrator 
of the VTP program? (E) Did the administrator have an insurance underwriter for its VTP 
product? (F) Who was the underwriter when the VTP product at issue was purchased? (G) 
Was the underwriter licensed and registered with the state? (H) What were the terms of the 
VTP product agreement? (I) Was the particular VTP contract registered with the State of 
Utah? (J) What promises were contained in the particular VTP contract? (K) Did the terms 
of the VTP contract include a monetary benefit? (L) Etc. 
The tedious and time-consuming nature of nearly 1700 of these individualized 
inquiries defeats any utility that the class action method could provide. The multitude of 
factual variations illustrate that the Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality 
are not met in this case and that even if the named Appellees were granted some relief by the 
Court, that relief could not automatically apply to all members of the class because of their 
disparate and individualized circumstances. Simply stated, adjudication of the claims of the 
class representatives will not adjudicate the claims of the class members. 
3. Appellees Do Not Meet the Adequacy of Representation 
Requirement of Rule 23(a). 
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Appellees are not adequate representatives of the VTP classes because their interests 
are not aligned with those of the putative class members. See Amchem Prods, v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997) ([A] class representative must be part of the class and possess 
the same interest and suffer the same injury as class members.). Rule 23(a)(4) requires that 
the plaintiffs provide Mfair and adequate protection for the interests of the class." Ditty, 182 
F.R.D. at 642. "Two factors are important in that determination: (1) the class attorney's 
qualifications, experience, and ability to conduct the litigation and (2) whether the named 
plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to those of the class." Id. (emphasis added). 
Appellees fail to address the interests of the named Appellees in relation to the 
putative class, which is the second required factor. Because class representatives must be part 
of a class, only the two named Appellees who actually purchased a VTP product, Dalton 
Jaques and Nicholas Rodarte, may serve as class representatives. Mr. Jaques purchased a car 
and a starter interrupt system from Midway in 2004. In the first set of contracts Jaques 
signed, the system cost was listed as $3500; in the second set of contracts, the price was 
reduced to $599.95. Mr. Rodarte purchased an acid etching system from MRM in 2004. Mr. 
Rodarte was charged $299.95 forthe etching system. An examination of Mr. Jaques1 and Mr. 
Rodarte's depositions raises serious doubts about the adequacy of their representation. Their 
interests are antagonistic to those of the putative class members, for several different reasons. 
Dalton Jaques. Mr. Jaques is an inadequate class representative because he does not 
understand what acting as a class representative entails. He testified in his deposition that he 
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is only concerned about his own claims, not the claims of the class. Mr. Jaques therefore is 
only looking out for himself and is oblivious to the fact that he is purportedly representing 
others. Mr. Jaques stated that his only concern is recovering money he allegedly lost by doing 
business with Midway. This is antagonistic to the interests of putative class members who 
need someone who is aware that there are other potential members of the class, and who is 
willing to seek a different, class-wide form of relief as requested in the Complaint, such as 
an injunction, rescission, and declaratory relief. Moreover, Mr. Jaques cannot represent VTP 
purchasers from MRM as he had no dealings with MRM. 
Nicholas Rodarte. Mr. Rodarte is an inadequate representative because he does not 
possess the same interest as other Appellees in suing over VTP products. Although he stated 
in his deposition that he was upset about being sold VTP, he did not say he was upset for any 
of the reasons asserted in the Complaint- i.e., that VTP products are insurance, that 
Appellants were not authorized the sell VTP, and that the VTP products were not 
underwritten by qualified insurers. Rather, Mr. Rodarte alleged that the VTP product charge 
was not disclosed to him and that if it had been disclosed, he would not have sued over VTP. 
(ROA 1063). Again it should be noted that the charge for the VTP product was clearly listed 
and identified as such on the sales contract Mr. Rodarte signed. Class members will not be 
protected by Mr. Rodarte who does not even make the same allegations of wrongdoing as 
Appellees. Moreover, Mr. Rodarte cannot represent the interests of Midway as he did not 
conduct business with Midway. 
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It appears that Appellees' counsel has located several individual plaintiffs who want 
to pursue disparate consumer claims against Appellants and has named them as class 
representatives, asserting claims he has fashioned. Given the inadequacy of representation 
under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as set forth above, this Court should find 
that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the VTP classes. 
2. Class certification was improper because Appellees cannot meet the 
Predominance and Superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). 
The district court erred in certifying the Doc Fees classes because Appellees failed to 
show that "questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members" and that "a class action is superior to other 
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Utah R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3). 
a. The Predominance Requirement Is Not Met Because Common 
Questions of Law and Fact Are Not Present and Therefore Do Not 
Predominate. 
The predominance requirement is "far more demanding" than the commonality 
requirement of Rule 23(a). Id. Appellees cannot meet the commonality requirement of Rule 
23(a), because MRM and Midway did not engage in a common plan or scheme, and 
individualized inquiries would have to be made into each Appellee's experience with being 
sold a VTP product. Furthermore, the class representatives testimony demonstrates that he 
class members are more interested in their individual claims and have little, if any, concern 
for the claims being made in this Class Action. Because commonality is not demonstrated, 
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the requirement of predominance is necessarily unmet. Class certification was thus improper. 
b. The Superiority Requirement Is Not Met Because the Named 
Appellees Are Interested Only in Their Individual Claims, and a 
Class Action Would Be Unmanageable. 
Appellees must also demonstrate that a class action is "superior to, and not just as 
good as, other available methods for handling the controversy." Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First 
Interstate Bank, 97 F.R.D. 440, 444 (D, Ore. 1983). The first two of the four superiority 
factors found in Rule 23(b) weigh in favor of a finding that superiority has not been met. A 
court considering the "interests of individual members in controlling their own cases" must 
"inform itself of any litigation actually pending by ... the individuals." Wilcox, 97 F.R.D. at 
444. As outlined above, in the initial Class Action Amended Complaint, Appellees asserted 
twenty-five individual causes of action apart from the class claims, which were severed from 
the class claims. These cases will proceed regardless of whether the class claims remain 
certified and whether they arise out of the same transactions as the class claims. Appellees 
have a strong interest in pursuing their own claims in the severed individual actions and lack 
interest in or knowledge about the VTP class claims. When asked to describe their 
grievances against Midway or MRM, they describe their unique individual experiences rather 
than complaints relating to VTP products. Appellees' ignorance of class grievances 
demonstrates that this putative class action is simply a collection of individual, unrelated 
claims and experiences. The superiority factor is thus not satisfied. 
Finally, the management of this class action will prove impossible, further precluding 
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Appellees from ever meeting the superiority requirement. Appellees' certified classes relating 
to VTP products encompass around 1700 car purchasers. Proving Appellees' claims would 
require individualized inquiries into the peculiar circumstances of each VTP product 
purchased. Accordingly, given the variety of deficiencies of the VTP classes in light of the 
requirements of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court should hold that the 
trial court abused its discretion with regard to the certification of the VTP classes. 
D. Certification of the Guaranteed Automobile Protection ("GAP") 
insurance classes was improper 
Appellees' allegations of wrongdoing regarding GAP insurance are twofold. First, 
Appellees claim the GAP insurance policies sold by Appellants promised monetary benefits 
from entities not approved as insurers in the State of Utah, and second, the GAP policies 
were sold on forms not approved by the State, These claims are not properly adjudicated as 
a class since they do not comply with the requirements of Rule 23. 
1. Class Certification was improper because Appellees cannot Meet the 
Commonality, Typicality, and Adequacy of Representation requirements 
of Rule 23(a). 
The district court erred in certifying the GAP insurance classes in this case since three 
of the four Rule 23(a) requirements, specifically commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation, are not met. See Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307,1310 (10th Cir. 1988). 
A. Lack of Commonality and Typicality. 
Neither commonality nor typicality are met on the facts of this case. Appellees' 
Complaint fails to adequately plead common plan or scheme of wrongdoing. In addition, 
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these proposed classes are not certifiable because the factual and legal questions of the 
Appellees vary according to each individual transaction with Appellants. 
1. Absence of a Common Plan or Scheme. 
Appellees make the broad, conclusory allegation that Appellants engaged in a 
common plan or scheme by selling GAP insurance that is not underwritten by qualified 
insurers licensed with the state. As a preliminary matter, this allegation has no factual support 
and is actually contrary to the facts developed during the first phase of discovery. There is 
no allegation that the manner in which Appellants sold GAP insurance was underhanded or 
shady or even unique from all other automobile dealers in Utah. Appellants in fact purchased 
forms and information from agents of the administrators, whose policies are undisputedly 
underwritten by qualified insurers. These agents sold these same policies to dealerships 
throughout Utah and the surrounding states. Appellants then offer these policies, pursuant 
to their "limited lines" licenses, to certain car buyers who, after being told about the products, 
express an interest in purchasing them. The process is as simple and uneventful as that. 
In their certification Motion, Appellees analogized this case to Johnson v. Rohr-Ville 
Motors, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 363 (N.D. 111. 1999), in which the court certified a class action 
involving alleged misrepresentations related to GAP insurance and other aspects of the 
named plaintiffs vehicle purchase. Id at 366. The plaintiff in Johnson alleged that the GAP 
insurance she bought was "totally worthless,11 and, by implication, the dealership knew it to 
be worthless, because the particular exclusions of the GAP policy as applied to her vehicle 
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purchase precluded her from recovering anything under the policy. Id. at 367. The plaintiff 
in Johnson sought to certify a class of purchasers who suffered the same injury, i.e. those 
who purchased GAP insurance policies containing exclusions that would render the policy 
worthless in the circumstances of their vehicle purchase. Id. 
In this case, unlike Johnson, Appellees have made no such allegations of deceit or 
misrepresentation by Midway or MRM, nor could they make such allegations in good faith. 
In addition to not alleging that Appellees sold a worthless product, as in Johnson, Appellees 
do not allege, nor could they allege, that Appellants altered the administrators' forms or 
created their own GAP insurance forms, deceived customers about the nature of the product, 
or deceived customers about the type of insurance licenses that they hold. Appellees have 
not alleged a common plan, scheme, or course of conduct giving rise to a cause of action. 
The Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality are not met. 
2. An Individualized Inquiry Into Each Plaintiff s Claim Is 
Required. 
No issues of fact are common to all class members. While it is true that all the 
proposed class members purchased GAP insurance, it is not true that all class members 
purchased the same type of GAP insurance involving the same administrator with the same 
underwriter on the same policy forms. The experiences of the Appellees are not similar to 
each other, much less typical of the entire putative class. If certification is upheld on appeal, 
this case will "devolve into a series of individual trials on issues peculiar to each [PJlaintiff." 
Zapata, 167 F.R.D. at 166. 
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Appellees acknowledge that Midway sold approximately 1543 GAP policies since 
opening in 2000 and that MRM has sold approximately 1141 GAP policies since opening in 
2004. Despite these numerous individual transactions, Appellees simply make the blanket 
assertion that "all of Appellants' GAP insurance policies were sold in violation of Utah law." 
Even assuming Appellees1 arguments merit further scrutiny, an investigation would require 
examination of the more than 2600 individual sales of GAP insurance. At Midway, GAP 
policies from at least eight different administrators were sold in different years during the 
relevant time period. At MRM, GAP policies from at least four different administrators were 
sold in different years during the relevant time period. Sometimes the administrator and the 
insurer/underwriter were one and the same. Sometimes they were not. At both MRM and 
Midway, even policies sold by the same administrator varied from year to year, as the terms 
and the insurance underwriters would change. Thus, to determine the legality of each policy 
sold, the trial court would have to determine: (A) When was the policy purchased? (B) From 
which dealership was it purchased? (C) Who was the administrator of the GAP program? (D) 
Was the program a "waiver" program or a traditional "insurance" program? (E) Did the 
administrator have an insurance underwriter for its GAP product? (F) If so, who is the 
underwriter? (G) Who was the underwriter when the policy at issue was purchased? (H) Is 
the underwriter licensed and registered with the Commission? (I) What are the terms of the 
GAP agreement? (J) Is the GAP agreement registered with the State of Utah? (K) Was the 
underlying financing contract between the dealership and the purchaser assigned to a 
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third-party financial institution? (L) Who is considered the lender in this particular 
transaction? (M) On what forms were the GAP policies issued? (N) Were the forms approved 
by the State of Utah? (O) Etc. 
The tedious and time-consuming nature of all of these individualized inquiries defeats 
any utility that the class action method could provide. The Court need look no further than 
the varying circumstances in which Appellees purchased GAP insurance to ascertain that this 
case is not appropriate for certification. See Brooks v. S. Bell Tel & Tel Co., 133 F.R.D. 54, 
57 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (where little commonality of fact exists between representative class 
members, there is likely even more disparity among class as a whole). 
For instance, Appellee Dalton Jaques purchased a used 2001 Toyota from Midway in 
August 2004. His purchase was financed and his loan was assigned to Wells Fargo Auto 
Finance, Inc. in conjunction with the purchase, he bought and financed an American Heritage 
Insurance Services ("AHIS") "GAP Addendum" policy for $600. The AHIS policy has 
always been underwritten by Allstate Insurance Company. 
By contrast, Appellee Nicholas Rodarte purchased a used Volkswagen Passat from 
Mike Riddle Mitsubishi in May 2004. His loan was assigned to Wells Fargo Auto Finance, 
Inc. in conjunction with the purchase, he bought a Beacon Worldwide Industries GAP 
"Deficiency Waiver Contract Addendum" policy for $500. Beacon has undergone several 
changes in underwriters over the past few years. 
The multitude of factual variations illustrate that the Rule 23(a) requirements of 
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commonality and typicality are not met in this case, and that even if the named Appellees 
were granted some relief by the Court, that relief could not automatically apply to all 
members of the class because of their disparate and individualized circumstances. 
Adjudication of the claims of the class representatives would not necessarily adjudicate the 
claims of the class members. 
B. Appellees Do Not Meet the Adequacy of Representation 
Requirement of Rule 23(a). 
Appellees are not adequate representatives because their interests are not aligned with 
those of the putative class. An examination of the named Appellees' depositions raises 
serious doubts about the adequacy of representation. Appellees' interests are antagonistic to 
those of the putative class members for varying reasons. Because class representatives must 
be part of the class, only those named Appellees who purchased GAP insurance-Dalton 
Jaques, Elisha Dela Garza, Severo Rodriguez, and Nicholas Rodarte-are discussed in this 
section. All of these Appellees are inadequate representatives, for the following reasons: 
First, the Appellees are primarily looking out for themselves and are, by and large, 
without knowledge as to their representation of others. These Appellees' only concern is 
recovering money they allegedly lost by doing business with Appellants. This is antagonistic 
to the interests of putative class members as such representatives would be uninterested in 
the alternate, class-wide forms of relief requested by the Complaint such as declaratory relief, 
an injunction, or rescission. Furthermore, when asked to describe why they were unhappy 
with Appellants, only one Appellee complained about being sold GAP insurance, and, as 
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described below, his complaints did not describe the same interest as those of other class 
members. Class members will not be protected by Appellees who do not share the same 
interests and concerns relating to GAP insurance. The flaws and inadequacies of each 
Plaintiff to be class representatives are illustrated below. 
Dalton Jaques. Mr. Jaques is an inadequate class representative because he does not 
understand what acting as a class representative entails. He testified in his deposition that he 
is only concerned about his own claims, not the claims of the class. (ROA 1455). 
Severo Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez is an inadequate class representative because 
he did not complain about being charged for GAP insurance. He testified that his allegations 
against Midway relate only to Midway incorrectly filling out documents. 
Elisha Dela Garza. Ms. Dela Garza has no understanding of what being a class 
representative entails, has no desire to act as a plaintiff in this case, and is only interested in 
recovering the money she believes she lost. (ROA 1458-59). When asked why she was 
unhappy with Midway, Ms. Dela Garza explained her allegation that Midway falsified 
information about her grandfather on the sales contract and sold her a four-cylinder vehicle 
instead of a six-cylinder vehicle. Ms. Dela Garza never mentioned being upset over GAP 
insurance. Id. 
Nicholas Rodarte. Mr. Rodarte is an inadequate representative because he does not 
possess the same interest as the putative class in suing over GAP insurance. Although he 
stated in his deposition that he was upset about GAP insurance, he did not say he was upset 
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because the insurance was not underwritten by qualified insurers. (ROA 912-916). Rather, 
Mr. Rodarte alleged that the GAP insurance charge was not disclosed to him and stated that 
if it had been disclosed, he would not have sued. (ROA 912-916)5. 
Given these Rule 23(a) deficiencies, the GAP classes should not have been certified. 
2. Class certification was improper because Appellees cannot meet the 
Predominance and Superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). 
Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) was improper since Appellees are unable to show 
that "questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members" and that "a class action is superior to other 
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Utah R. Civ. P. 
23(b)(3). 
A. The Predominance Requirement Is Not Met Because Common 
Questions of Law and Fact Are Not Present and Therefore Do Not 
Predominate. 
As stated previously, predominance requirement is "far more demanding" than the 
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a). Id. Appellees cannot meet the commonality 
requirement of Rule 23(a), because MRM and Midway did not engage in a common plan or 
scheme, and extensive individualized inquiries would have to be made into the purchase of 
each Appellees GAP insurance policy. Furthermore, the class representatives testimony 
demonstrates that the class members are more interested in their individual claims and have 
5Similar to the Doc Fee and VTP charges, the GAP insurance fee was clearly listed 
and identified as such on the sales contract Mr. Rodarte signed. 
68 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
little, if any, concern for the claims being made by way of this Class Action. Because 
commonality is not demonstrated, the requirement of predominance is necessarily unmet. 
Class certification is thus improper. 
B. The Superiority Requirement Is Not Met Because the Named 
Appellees Are Interested Only in Their Individual Claims, and a 
Class Action Would Be Unmanageable. 
Appellees must also demonstrate that a class action is "superior to, and not just as 
good as, other available methods for handling the controversy.11 Wilcox Dev. Co., 97 F.R.D. 
at 444. Again, similar to the VTP classes, the first two of the four Rule 23(b) superiority 
factors weigh in favor of a finding that superiority has not been met. A court considering the 
"interests of individual members in controlling their own cases" must "inform itself of any 
litigation actually pending by ... the individuals." Wilcox, 97 F.R.D. at 444. As stated above, 
the Appellees' 25 individual claims have been separated out and will proceed independently 
of the class action. Thus, Appellees already have litigation pending in this Court on their 
numerous individual causes of action. These cases will proceed regardless of whether the 
GAP claims are certified and they arise out of the same transactions as the class claims. 
Appellees have a primary interest in pursuing their own claims in the severed individual 
actions. By contrast, they lack interest in or knowledge about the class claims and seem to 
have no idea what serving as a class representative entails. When asked to describe their 
grievances against Midway or MRM, they describe their unique individual experiences and 
do not express concerns over the class claims related to GAP insurance. The superiority 
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factor is thus not satisfied. 
Finally, the management of this class action would again prove difficult, further 
precluding Appellees from meeting the superiority requirement. Appellees1 first proposed 
class-all purchasers of GAP insurance from Midway-consists of approximately 1543 
members; Appellees' second proposed class-all purchasers of GAP insurance from MRM-
consists of approximately 1141 members. As described above, proving Appellees' claims 
would require individualized inquiries into the peculiar circumstances of each and every 
GAP insurance policy purchased, rendering this action unmanageable. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's ruling denying Appellants' Motion to Dismiss was in error and 
should be reversed. No private right of action exists under Utah law to enforce provisions 
of the Insurance Code. 
Further, the lower court abused its discretion in certifying the Doc Fee, VTP and GAP 
classes. Each certification fails, on multiple levels, to meet the requirements of Rule 23 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The ruling of the lower court with regard to the 
certification of the Doc Fee, VTP and GAP classes should also be reversed. 
DATED this day of June, 2009. 
.C. 
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:i;f) INSURANCE CODE 31A-15-107 
M much of the regulation provided by this title as is required 
.» a comparable policy written by an authorized foreign 
»surer. 
•ID (a) A surplus lines transaction in this state shall be 
examined to determine whether it complies with: 
(i) the surplus lines tax levied under Chapter 3, 
Department Funding, Fees, and Taxes; 
fii) the solicitation limitations of Subsection (3); 
(iii) the requirement of Subsection (3) that place-
ment be through a surplus lines producer; 
(iv) placement limitations imposed under Subsec-
tions (6)(a), (b), and (c); and 
(v) the policy form requirements of Subsections (8) 
and (10). 
(b) The examination described in Subsection (ll)(a) 
shall take place as soon as practicable after the transac-
tion. The surplus lines producer shall submit to the 
examiner information necessary to conduct the examina-
tion within a period specified by rule. 
(c) (i) The examination described in Subsection (11 Ma) 
may be conducted by the commissioner or by an 
advisory organization created under Section 31 A-15-
111 and authorized by the commissioner to conduct 
these examinations. The commissioner is not re-
quired to authorize an additional advisory organiza-
tion to conduct an examination under this Subsection 
(ll)(e). 
(ii) The commissioner's authorization of one or 
more advisory organizations to act as examiners 
under this Subsection (11 He) shall be: 
(A) by rule; and 
(B) evidenced by a contract, on a form pro-
vided by the commissioner, between the autho-
rized advisory organization and the department. 
(d) (i) (A) A person conducting the examination de-
scribed in Subsection (ll)(a) shall collect a 
stamping fee of an amount not to exceed 1% of 
the policy premium payable in connection with 
the transaction. 
(B) A stamping fee collected by the commis-
sioner shall be deposited in the General Fund. 
(O) The commissioner shall establish a stamp-
ing fee by rule. 
(ii) A stamping fee collected by an advisory orga-
nization is the property of the advisory organization 
to be used in paying the expenses of the advisory 
organization. 
(iii) Liability for paying a stamping fee is as re-
quired under Subsection 31A-3-303U) for taxes im-
posed under Section 31A-3-301. 
(iv) The commissioner shall adopt a rule dealing 
with the payment of stamping fees. If a stamping fee 
is not paid when due, the commissioner or advisory 
organization may impose a penalty of 25% of the 
stamping fee due, plus l-¥i% per month from the 
time of default until full payment of the stamping fee. 
(v) A stamping fee relative to a policy covering a 
risk located partially in this state shall be allocated in 
the same manner as under Subsection 31A-3-303(4). 
(e) The commissioner, representatives of the depart-
ment, advisory organizations, representatives and mem-
bers of advisory organizations, authorized insurers, and 
surplus lines insurers are not liable for damages on 
account of statements, comments, or recommendations 
made in good faith in connection with their duties under 
this Subsection (ll)(e) or under Section 31A-15-111. 
(f) An examination conducted under this Subsection 
(11) and a document or materials related to the examina-
tion are confidential. 20°8 
31A-15-104. Direct placement of insurance. 
(1) Subject to this section, any person seeking insurance 
may obtain it from an unauthorized insurer if no producer 
resident doing business in Utah is involved and if negotiations 
occur primarily outside Utah. Negotiations by mail occur 
within Utah if a letter or other document containing insur-
ance-related solicitations or negotiations is sent from or to a 
Utah address. Negotiations by telephone take place within 
Utah if one of the parties to the conversation is in Utah. 
(2) Each policyholder who procures or renews insurance 
otherwise subject to this code from any insurer not authorized 
to do business in Utah, other than insurance procured under 
Section 31A-15-103 and the renewal of guaranteed renewable 
insurance lawfully issued outside Utah, shall within 60 days 
after the insurance is procured or renewed, report to the 
commissioner in the form required by the commissioner and 
pay the taxes specified by Section 31A-3-301. 
(3) (a) Any insurance on personal property sold on the 
installment plan, under a conditional sales contract, or an 
equivalent security agreement under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code which charges the buyer, as a part of the 
consideration in the agreement of sale for insurance on 
the property, shall be placed with an insurer authorized to 
do business in Utah. 
(b) Whenever the law of Utah requires a person to 
purchase insurance on risks in Utah, it shall be obtained 
from an insurer authorized to do business in Utah, or 
under Section 31A-15-103. 2003 
31A-15-105. Effect of contracts illegal because insurer 
was unauthorized. 
(1) An insurance contract entered into in violation of this 
chapter is unenforceable by, but enforceable against, the 
insurer. In an action against the insurer on the contract, the 
insured is bound by the terms of the contract as affected by 
this title and rules adopted under this title. 
(2) y\n insurance policy entered into in violation of this 
chapter is voidable by the policyholder who entered into the 
transaction without knowing it was illegal. The policyholder 
may avoid the contract by notice to the insurer, if no insured 
has enforced the contract by an action under Subsection (1), 
and may recover any consideration paid under the contract. 
(3) Any person who assisted in the procurement of an 
illegal contract under this chapter, and who knew or should 
have known the transaction was illegal, is liable to the insured 
for the full amount of a claim or loss payable under the 
contract, if the insurer does not pay it. The receiver appointed 
under Chapter 27a, Insurer Receivership Act, may assert the 
claims of insureds if the insurer is the subject of a proceeding 
under Chapter 27a. 2007 
31A-15-106. Servicing of contracts made out of state. 
( D A foreign insurer that does not have a certificate of 
authority to do business in this state under Section 31A-14-
202 may, in this state, collect premiums and adjust losses and 
do all other acts reasonably incidental to contracts made 
outside this state without violating this chapter. Any premi-
ums collected under this section are subject to Section 31A-3-
301. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not permit a renewal, extension, 
increase, or other substantial change in the terms of any 
contract under Subsection (1) unless: 
(a) it is permitted under Section 31A-15-103; 
(b) the contract is for life or accident and health insur-
ance or annuities; or 
(c) a rule adopted by the commissioner permits this 
action when the interests of the policyholder and the 
public appear to be sufficiently protected. 2001 
31A-15-107. Defense of action by unauthorized person. 
(1) Except under Subsection (3), no pleading, notice, order, 
or process in any action in court or in any administrative Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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31A-14-214 INSURANCE CODE 262 
31A-14-214. Amendment to articles and notice of cor-
porate reorganization. 
Sections 16-10a-1001 through 16-10a-1004 apply when a 
foreign insurer amends its articles of incorporation. If a 
foreign insurer plans to undergo any corporate reorganization 
of the kinds dealt with in Chapter 5, Part 5, Corporate 
Reorganization, the insurer shall notify the commissioner in 
writing, at the same time that the first formal step of the 
statutory procedure for achieving the reorganization is taken 
in the domiciliary jurisdiction or elsewhere. The insurer shall 
provide the details required by the commissioner, whether by 
rule or order. 2004 
31A-14-215. Assessment by foreign company. 
Every foreign mutual insurer authorized in this state shall 
notify the commissioner immediately after making an assess-
ment upon any of its members in this state. The insurer shall 
attach to the notice a statement of the condition of the insurer, 
giving the facts showing the necessity for the assessment. 
Unless the commissioner orders otherwise under a Chapter 
27, Part 5, Administrative Actions, proceeding, a foreign 
mutual insurer authorized in this state may not make or 
increase any assessment because of its inability to collect 
assessments from its members in other states. 2007 
31A-14-216. Release from regulation. 
(1) A foreign insurer authorized under this chapter is 
subject to regulation under the applicable provisions of the 
Insurance Code, unless it is released from regulation under 
this section. 
(2) A foreign insurer may apply for release from regulation 
by filing with the commissioner: 
(a) its certificate of authority; 
(b) a schedule of its outstanding liabilities from policies 
issued in this state to residents of Utah or on risks located 
in Utah, and from other business transactions in Utah; 
(c) a plan for securing the discharge of those outstand-
ing liabilities; and 
(d) any other information as reasonably required by 
the commissioner. 
(3) The commissioner shall promptly release the insurer 
from regulation if he finds all the following: 
(a) The insurer has stopped doing any new business in 
Utah. 
(b) The discharge of existing liabilities to creditors in 
Utah is sufficiently secured. 
(c) The release would not otherwise be prejudicial to 
the interests of insureds or creditors in Utah or, if the 
insurer is an alien insurer and Utah is the state of entry 
into the United States, of all insureds and creditors in the 
United States. 
(4) Before deciding on the release, the commissioner may 
require the insurer to notify, at its own expense, all agents or 
other classes of potentially interested persons in a manner the 
commissioner prescribes, including publication of its with-
drawal from Utah. The notice shall advise affected persons to 
communicate to the commissioner any objections they may 
have to the insurer's release from regulation. 
(5) As a prerequisite for releasing the insurer, the commis-
sioner may require a deposit under Section 31A-2-206, a bond 
issued by a surety authorized in Utah, or other appropriate 
security or reinsurance in a sufficient amount to secure the 
proper discharge of the insurer's remaining liabilities in Utah. 
The commissioner may also require the insurer to sign an 
agreement to remain subject to the jurisdiction of the commis-
sioner and the courts of Utah with respect to any matter 
arising out of business done in Utah prior to the release. 
1985 
31A-14-217. Revocation of certificate of authority. 
Whenever there would be grounds for delinquency proceed-
ings under Chapter 27a, Insurer Receivership Act, against a 
foreign insurer, if the foreign insurer were a domestic insurer, 
the commissioner may, after any proceeding authorized by 
Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, revoke, 
suspend, or limit the foreign insurer's certificate of authority. 
This action does not affect insurance which has already been 
issued. The insurer remains subject to regulation until re-
leased under Section 31A-14-216. 2008 
CHAPTER 15 
UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS, SURPLUS LINES, AND 
RISK RETENTION GROUPS 
Part 1 
Unauthorized Insurers and Surplus Lines 
Section 
31A-15-101. Purposes. 
31A-15-102. Assisting unauthorized insurers. 
31A-15-103. Surplus lines insurance — Unauthorized in-
surers. 
31A-15-104. Direct placement of insurance. 
31A-15-105. Effect of contracts illegal because insurer was 
unauthorized. 
31A-15-106. Servicing of contracts made out of state. 
31A-15-107. Defense of action by unauthorized person. 
31A-15-108. Attorney fees. 
31A-15-109. Investigation and disclosure of insurance con-
tracts. 
31A-15-110. Reporting of illegal insurance. 
31A-15-111. Surplus lines advisory organizations. 
Part 2 
Risk Retention Groups 
31A-15-201. Short title. 
31A-15-202. Definitions. 
31A-15-203. Risk retention groups chartered in this state. 
31 A-15-204. Risk retention groups not chartered in this 
state — Designation of commissioner as 
agent — Compliance with unfair claims set-
tlement practices act — Deceptive, false, or 
fraudulent practices — Examination regard-
ing financial condition — Prohibitions — 
Penalties — Operation prior to enactment of 
this part. 
31A-15-205. Guaranty associations. 
31A-15-206. Repealed. 
31A-15-207. Purchasing groups — Exemption from certain 
laws. 
31A-15-208. Purchasing groups — Filing and registration 
requirements. 
31 A-15-209. Restrictions on purchasing groups. 
31A-15-210. Purchasing group taxation. 
31A-15-211. Enforcement authority. 
31A-15-212. Duty of producers to obtain license — Risk 
retention groups — Purchasing groups. 
31A-15-213. Effect of orders issued in U.S. District Court. 
31A-15-214. Severability. 
PARTI 
UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS AND SURPLUS LINES 
31A-15-101. Purposes. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to: 
(1) prevent evasion by unauthorized insurers of the 
regulatory and tax laws of Utah and protect Utah and its 
residents against loss from that type of evasion; 
K-A 
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. !<; ;* INSURANCE CODE 31A-15-103 
(2) subject unauthorized insurers and other persons 
doing an insurance business in Utah to the jurisdiction of 
the Utah commissioner and courts; 
(3) protect authorized insurers from unfair competition 
by unauthorized insurers; and 
(4) provide an orderly method, under reasonable and 
practical safeguards, for procuring insurance from unau-
thorized insurers. 1985 
:UA-15-102. Assisting unauthorized insurers. 
(1) No person may do any act enumerated under Subsection 
''.U who knows or should know that the act may assist in the 
illegal placement of insurance with an unauthorized insurer 
nr the subsequent servicing of an insurance policy illegally 
placed with an unauthorized insurer. 
(2) An act performed by mail is performed both at the place 
M{ mailing and at the place of delivery. Any of the following 
acts, whether performed by mail or otherwise, fall within the 
prohibition of Subsection (1): 
(a) soliciting, making, or proposing to make an insur-
ance contract; 
(b) taking, receiving, or forwarding an application for 
insurance; 
(c) collecting or receiving, in full or in part, an insur-
ance premium; 
(d) issuing or delivering an insurance policy or other 
evidence of an insurance contract except as a messenger 
not employed by the insurer, or an insurance producer; 
(e) doing any of the following in connection with the 
solicitation, negotiation, procuring, or effectuation of in-
surance coverage for another: inspecting risks, setting 
rates, advertising, disseminating information, or advising 
on risk management; 
(f) publishing or disseminating any advertisement en-
couraging the placement or servicing of insurance thai? 
would violate vSubscction (1); however this provision does 
not apply to publication or dissemination to an audience 
primarily outside Utah that also reaches persons in Utah 
unless the extension to persons inside Utah can be con-
veniently avoided without substantial expense other than 
loss of revenue; nor does it apply to regional or national 
network programs on radio or television unless they 
originate in Utah; 
(g) investigating, settling, adjusting, or litigating 
claims; or 
(h) representing or assisting any person to do an un-
authorized insurance business or to procure insurance 
from an unauthorized insurer. 
(3) Subsection (1) does not prohibit: 
(a) an attorney acting for a client; 
(b) a full-time salaried employee of an insured acting in 
the capacity of an insurance buyer or manager; or 
(c) insurance activities described under Section 31A-
15-103. 
(4) Any act performed in Utah which is prohibited under 
this section constitutes appointment of the commissioner or 
the lieutenant governor as agent for service of process under 
Sections 31A-2-309 and 31A-2-310. 
(5) Any person or entity who knows or should know that the 
person's or entity's actions assist in the illegal placement of 
insurance in violation of this section is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 2005 
31A-15-103. Surplus lines insurance — Unauthorized 
insurers. 
(1) Notwithstanding Section 31A-15-102, a foreign insurer 
that has not obtained a certificate of authority to do business 
in this state under Section 31A-14-202 may negotiate for and 
make an insurance contract with a person in this state and on 
a risk located in this state, subject to the limitations and 
requirements of this section. 
(2) (a) For a contract made under this section, the insurer 
may, in this state: 
(i) inspect the risks to be insured; 
(ii) collect premiums; 
(iii) adjust losses; and 
(iv) do another act reasonably incidental to the 
contract, 
(b) An act described in Subsection (2)(a) may be done 
through: 
(i) an employee; or 
(ii) an independent contractor. 
(3) (a) Subsections (1) and (2) do not permit a person to 
solicit business in this state on behalf of an insurer that 
has no certificate of authority. 
(b) Insurance placed with a nonadmitted insurer shall 
be placed with a surplus lines producer licensed under 
Chapter 23a, Insurance Marketing — Licensing Produc-
ers, Consultants, and Reinsurance Intermediaries. 
(c) The commissioner may by rule prescribe how a 
surplus lines producer may: 
(i) pay or permit the payment, commission, or 
other remuneration on insurance placed by the sur-
plus lines producer under authority of the surplus 
lines producer's license to one holding a license to act 
as an insurance producer; and 
(ii) advertise the availability of the surplus lines 
producer's services in procuring, on behalf of a person 
seeking insurance, a contract with a nonadmitted 
insurer. 
(4) For a contract made under this section, a nonadmitted 
insurer is subject to Sections 31A-23a-402 and 31A-23a-403 
and the rules adopted under those sections. 
(5) A nonadmitted insurer may not issue workers' compen-
sation insurance coverage to an employer located in this state, 
except for stop loss coverage issued to an employer securing 
workers'compensation under Subsection 34A-2-20K3). 
(6) (a) The commissioner may by rule prohibit making a 
contract under Subsection (1) for a specified class of 
insurance if authorized insurers provide an established 
market for the class in this state that is adequate and 
reasonably competitive. 
(b) The commissioner may by rule place a restriction or 
a limitation on and create special procedures for making a 
contract under Subsection (1) for a specified class of 
insurance if: 
(i) there have been abuses of placements in the 
class; or 
(ii) the policyholders in the class, because of lim-
ited financial resources, business experience, or 
knowledge, cannot protect their own interests ade-
quately. 
(c) The commissioner may prohibit an individual in-
surer from making a contract under Subsection (1) and all 
insurance producers from dealing with the insurer if: 
(i) the insurer willfully violates: 
(A) this section; 
(B) Section 31A-4-102, 31A-23a-402, or 31A-
26-303: or 
(C) a rule adopted under a section listed in 
Subsection (6Kc)(i)(A) or (B); 
(ii) the insurer fails to pay the fees and taxes 
specified under Section 31A-3-301; or 
(iii) the commissioner has reason to believe that 
the insurer is: 
(A) in an unsound condition; 
(B) operated in a fraudulent, dishonest, or 
incompetent manner; or 
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(a) in Salt Lake City; and 
(b) elsewhere, if approved by the governor as necessary 
for the efficient operation of the department. 
(2) The commissioner shall, in accordance with the rules of 
the Department of Administrative Services or other applicable 
laws, procure or obtain access to all materials, supplies, and 
equipment necessary for the efficient operation of the Insur-
ance Department, including reasonable library facilities and 
books. 1985 
PART 2 
DUTIES AND POWERS OF COMMISSIONER 
31A-2-201. General duties and powers. 
(1) The commissioner shall administer and enforce this 
title. 
(2) The commissioner has all powers specifically granted, 
and all further powers that are reasonable and necessary to 
enable the commissioner to perform the duties imposed by this 
title. 
(3) (a) The commissioner may make rules to implement the 
provisions of this title according to the procedures and 
requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administra-
tive Rulemaking Act. 
(b) In addition to the notice requirements of Section 
63G-3-301, the commissioner shall provide notice under 
Section 31A-2-303 of hearings concerning insurance de-
partment rules. 
(4) (a) The commissioner shall issue prohibitory, manda-
tory, and other orders as necessary to secure compliance 
with this title. An order by the commissioner is not 
effective unless the order: 
(i) is in writing; and 
(ii) is signed by the commissioner or under the 
commissioner's authority 
(b) On request of any person who would be affected by 
an order under Subsection (4)(a), the commissioner may 
issue a declaratory order to clarify the person's rights or 
duties. 
(5) (a) The commissioner may hold informal adjudicative 
proceedings and public meetings, for the purpose of: 
(i) investigation; 
(ii) ascertainment of public sentiment; or 
(iii) informing the public. 
(b) An effective rule or order may not result from 
informal hearings and meetings unless the requirement 
of a hearing under this section is satisfied. 
(6) The commissioner shall inquire into violations of this 
title and may conduct any examinations and investigations of 
insurance matters, in addition to examinations and investiga-
tions expressly authorized, that the commissioner considers 
proper to determine: 
(a) whether or not any person has violated any provi-
sion of this title; or 
(b) to secure information useful in the lawful adminis-
tration of this title. 
(7) (a) Each year, the commissioner shall: 
(i) conduct an evaluation of the state's health in-
surance market; 
(ii) report the findings of the evaluation to the 
Health and Human Services Interim Committee be-
fore October 1; and 
(iii) publish the findings of the evaluation on the 
department website, 
(b) The evaluation required by Subsection (7)(a) shall: 
(i) analyze the effectiveness of the insurance regu-
lations and statutes in promoting a healthy, compet-
itive health insurance market that meets the needs of 
Utahns by assessing such things as: 
(A) the availability and marketing of individ-
ual and group products; 
(B) rate charges; 
(C) coverage and demographic changes; 
(D) benefit trends; 
(E) market share changes; and 
(F) accessibility; 
(ii) assess complaint ratios and trends within the 
health insurance market, which assessment shall 
integrate complaint data from the Office of Consumer 
Health Assistance within the department; 
(iii) contain recommendations for action to im-
prove the overall effectiveness of the health insurance 
market, administrative rules, and statutes; and 
(iv) include claims loss ratio data for each insur-
ance company doing business in the state, 
(c) When preparing the evaluation required by this 
Subsection (7), the commissioner may seek the input of 
insurers, employers, insured persons, providers, and oth-
ers with an interest in the health insurance market. 
2008 
31A-2-201.1. General filing requirements . 
Except as otherwise provided in this title, the commissioner 
may set by rule made in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, specific requirements 
for filing any of the following required by this title: 
(1) a form; 
(2) a rate; or 
(3) a report. 2008 
31A-2-202. Reports and replies. 
1
 (1) When relevant, either directly or indirectly, to the per-
formance of the commissioner's duties under this title, the 
commissioner may require from any person subject to regula-
tion under this title: 
(a) in whatever reasonable form and reasonable inter-
vals the commissioner designates: 
(i) a statement; 
(ii) a report; 
(iii) an answer to a questionnaire; 
(iv) other information; and 
(v) evidence of the information described in Sub-
sections (l)(a)(i) through (iv); 
(b) full explanation of the programming of any data 
storage or communication system in use; 
(c) information from books, records, electronic data 
processing systems, computers, or any other information 
storage system be made available to the department: 
(i) at any reasonable time; and 
(ii) in any reasonable manner; and 
(d) timely delivery to the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners or other entity that gathers insur-
ance industry information, a copy of the statistical data 
prepared for and submitted to the department, as speci-
fied by the commissioner. 
(2) (a) Subject to the requirements of this Subsection (2), 
the commissioner may: 
(i) prescribe forms for the information under Sub-
section (1); and 
(ii) specify who shall execute or certify the infor-
mation under Subsection (1). 
(b) The forms prescribed under this Subsection (2) 
shall be consistent, to the extent practicable, with those 
prescribed by other jurisdictions. 
(c) The commissioner shall use the annual statement 
forms developed by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners for: 
(i) basic financial data; and 
(ii) market regulation analysis. 
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(3) (a) Subject to the requirements of this Subsection (3), 
the commissioner may prescribe reasonable minimum 
standards and techniques of accounting and data han-
dling to ensure that timely and reliable information exists 
and can be made available. 
(b) The standards and techniques prescribed under 
this Subsection (3) shall be consistent, to the extent 
practicable, with those prescribed by other states. 
(4) (a) A person listed in Subsection (4)(b) shall reply 
promptly in writing or in other designated form to a 
reasonable written inquiry from the commissioner. 
(b) This Subsection (4) applies to any person with 
executive authority over or in charge of any segment of 
the affairs of: 
(i) an insurer authorized to do or doing an insur-
ance business in this state; 
(ii) the affiliate of an insurer authorized to do or 
doing an insurance business in this state; and 
(iii) any other person licensed under this title. 
(5) The commissioner may: 
(a) require that any communication made under this 
section be verified; and 
(b) specify by whom a communication shall be verified. 
(6) All information submitted to the commissioner shall be 
accurate and complete. 
(7) In the absence of actual malice, no communication to the 
commissioner required by law or by the commissioner subjects 
the person making it to an action for damages for defamation. 
2006 
31A-2-203. Examinations and alternatives. 
(1) (a) Whenever the commissioner determines that infor-
mation is needed about a matter related* to the enforce-
ment of this title, the commissioner may examine the 
affairs and condition of: 
Ci) a licensee under this title; 
(ii) an applicant for a license under this title; 
(iii) a person or organization of persons doing or in 
process of organizing to do an insurance business in 
this state; or 
(iv) a person who is not, but should be, licensed 
under this title. 
(b) When reasonably necessary for an examination 
under Subsection (l)(a), the commissioner may examine: 
(i) so far as it relates to the examinee, an account, 
record, document, or evidence of a transaction of: 
(A) the insurer or other licensee; 
(B) an officer or other person who has execu-
tive authority over or is in charge of any segment 
of the examinee's affairs; or 
(C) an affiliate of the examinee; or 
(ii) a third party model or product used by the 
examinee. 
(c) (i) On demand, an examinee under Subsection 
(l)(a) shall make available to the commissioner for 
examination: 
(A) the examinee's own account, record, file, 
document, or evidence of a transaction; and 
(B) to the extent reasonably necessary for an 
examination, an account, record, file, document, 
or evidence of a transaction of a person described 
under Subsection (1Kb). 
(ii) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(c)(iii), 
failure to make an item described in Subsection 
(l)(c)(i) available is concealment of records under 
Subsection 31A-27a-207(l)(e). 
(iii) If the examinee is unable to obtain an account, 
record, file, document, or evidence of a transaction 
from a person described under Subsection (l)(b), that 
failure is not concealment of records if the examinee 
immediately terminates the relationship with the 
other person, 
(d) (i) Neither the commissioner nor an examiner may 
remove an account, record, file, document, evidence of 
a transaction, or other property of the examinee from 
the examinee's offices unless: 
(A) the examinee consents in writing; or 
(B) a court grants permission. 
(ii) The commissioner may make and remove a 
copy or abstract of the following described in Subsec-
tion (l)(d)(i): 
(A) an account; 
(B) a record; 
(C) a file; 
(D) a document; 
(E) evidence of a transaction; or 
(F) other property. 
(2) (a) Subject to the other provisions of this section, the 
commissioner shall examine as needed and as otherwise 
provided by law: 
(i) every insurer, both domestic and nondomestic; 
(ii) every licensed rate service organization; and 
(iii) any other licensee. 
(b) The commissioner shall examine an insurer, both 
domestic and nondomestic, no less frequently than once 
every five years, but the commissioner may use in lieu an 
examination under Subsection (4) to satisfy this require-
ment. 
(c) The commissioner shall revoke the certificate of 
authority of an insurer or the license of a rate service 
organization that has not been examined, or submitted an 
acceptable in lieu report under Subsection (4), within the 
past five years. 
(d) (i) Any 25 persons who are policyholders, share-
holders, or creditors of a domestic insurer may by 
verified petition demand a hearing under Section 
31A-2-301 to determine whether the commissioner 
should conduct an unscheduled examination of the 
insurer. 
(ii) Persons demanding the hearing under this 
Subsection (2)(d) shall be given an opportunity in the 
hearing to present evidence that an examination of 
the insurer is necessary. 
(iii) If the evidence justifies an examination, the 
commissioner shall order an examination. 
(e) (i) If the board of directors of a domestic insurer 
requests that the commissioner examine the insurer, 
the commissioner shall examine the insurer as soon 
as reasonably possible. 
(ii) If the examination requested under this Sub-
section (2)(e) is conducted within two years after 
completion of a comprehensive examination by the 
commissioner, costs of the requested examination 
may not be deducted from premium taxes under 
Section 59-9-102 unless the commissioner's order 
specifically provides for the deduction. 
(f) A bail bond surety company, as defined in Section 
31A-35-102, is exempt from: 
(i) the five-year examination requirement in Sub-
section (2Kb); 
(ii) the revocation under Subsection (2)(c); and 
(iii) Subsections (2)(d) and (2)(e). 
(3) (a) The commissioner may order an independent audit 
or examination by one or more technical experts, includ-
ing a certified public accountant or actuary: 
(i) in lieu of all or part of an examination under 
Subsection (1) or (2); or 
(ii) in addition to an examination under Subsec-
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(b) An audit or evaluation under this Subsection (3) is 
subject to Subsection (5), Section 31A-2-204, and Subsec-
tion 31A-2-205(4). 
(4) (a) In lieu of all or a part of an examination under this 
section, the commissioner may accept the report of an 
examination made by: 
(i) the insurance department of another state; or 
(ii) another government agency in: 
(A) this state; 
(B) the federal government; or 
(C) another state. 
(b) An examination by the commissioner under Subsec-
tion (1) or (2) or accepted by the commissioner under this 
Subsection (4) may use: 
(i) an audit already made by a certified public 
accountant; or 
(ii) an actuarial evaluation made by an actuary 
approved by the commissioner. 
(5) (a) An examination may be comprehensive or limited 
with respect to the examinee's affairs and condition. The 
commissioner shall determine the nature and scope of 
each examination, taking into account all relevant fac-
tors, including: 
(i) the length of time the examinee has been li-
censed in this state; 
(ii) the nature of the business being examined; 
(iii) the nature of the accounting or other records 
available; 
(iv) one or more reports from: 
(A) independent auditors; and 
(B) self-certification entities; and 
(v) the nature of examinations performed else-
where, 
(b) The examination of an alien insurer is limited to 
one or more insurance transactions and assets in the 
United States, unless the commissioner orders otherwise 
after finding that extraordinary circumstances necessi-
tate a broader examination. 
(6) To effectively administer this section, the commissioner: 
(a) shall: 
(i) maintain one or more effective financial condi-
tion and market regulation surveillance systems in-
cluding: 
(A) financial and market analysis; and 
(B) a review of insurance regulatory informa-
tion system reports; 
(ii) employ a priority scheduling method that fo-
cuses on insurers and other licensees most in need of 
examination; and 
(iii) use examination management techniques sim-
ilar to those outlined in the Financial Condition 
Examination Handbook of the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners; and 
(b) in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, may make rules pertain-
ing to a financial condition and market regulation surveil-
lance system. 2008 
31A-2-203.5. Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings. 
The commissioner of insurance shall comply with the pro-
cedures and requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, in its adjudicative proceedings. 2008 
31A-2-204. Conducting examinations. 
(1) (a) For each examination under Section 31A-2-203, the 
commissioner shall issue an order: 
(i) stating the scope of the examination; and 
(ii) designating the examiner in charge, 
(b) The commissioner need not give advance notice of 
an examination to an examinee. 
(c) The examiner in charge shall give the examinee a 
copy of the order issued under this Subsection (1). 
(d) (i) The commissioner may alter the scope or nature 
of an examination at any time without advance notice 
to the examinee. 
(ii) If the commissioner amends an order described 
in this Subsection (1), the commissioner shall provide 
a copy of any amended order to the examinee. 
(e) Statements in the commissioner's examination or-
der concerning examination scope are for the examiner's 
guidance only. 
(f) Examining relevant matters not mentioned in an 
order issued under this Subsection (1) is not a violation of 
this title. 
(2) The commissioner shall, whenever practicable, cooper-
ate with the insurance regulators of other states by conducting 
joint examinations of: 
(a) multistate insurers doing business in this state; or 
(b) other multistate licensees doing business in this 
state. 
(3) An examiner authorized by the commissioner shall, 
when necessary to the purposes of the examination, have 
access at all reasonable hours to the premises and to any 
books, records, files, securities, documents, or property of: 
(a) the examinee; and 
(b) any of the following if the premises, books, records, 
files, securities, documents, or property relate to the 
affairs of the examinee: 
(i) an officer of the examinee; 
(ii) any other person who: 
(A) has executive authority over the exam-
inee; or 
(B) is in charge of any segment of the examin-
ee's affairs; or 
(iii) any affiliate of the examinee under Subsection 
31A-2-203(l)(b). 
(4) (a) The officers, employees, and agents of the examinee 
and of persons under Subsection 31A-2-203(l)(b) shall 
comply with every reasonable request of the examiners 
for assistance in any matter relating to the examination. 
(b) A person may not obstruct or interfere with the 
examination except by legal process. 
(5) If the commissioner finds the accounts or records to be 
inadequate for proper examination of the condition and affairs 
of the examinee or improperly kept or posted, the commis-
sioner may employ experts to rewrite, post, or balance the 
accounts or records at the expense of the examinee. 
(6) (a) The examiner in charge of an examination shall 
make a report of the examination no later than 60 days 
after the completion of the examination that shall include: 
(i) the information and analysis ordered under 
Subsection (1); and 
(ii) the examiner's recommendations. 
(b) At the option of the examiner in charge, preparation 
of the report may include conferences with the examinee 
or representatives of the examinee. 
(c) The report is confidential until the report becomes a 
public document under Subsection (7), except the commis-
sioner may use information from the report as a basis for 
action under Chapter 27a, Insurer Receivership Act. 
(7) (a) The commissioner shall serve a copy of the exami-
nation report described in Subsection (6) upon the exam-
inee. 
(b) Within 20 days after service, the examinee shall: 
(i) accept the examination report as written; or 
(ii) request agency action to modify the examina-
tion report. 
(c) The report is considered accepted under this Sub-
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ing costs, which the commissioner may do if he had 
reasonable cause to believe that the order which 
issued or might have issued was necessary. 
(3) Whenever the commissioner is reimbursed for costs 
under this section, the expenditures shall not be charged 
against the department budget. 1987 
31A-2-302. Commissioner's disapproval. 
(1) When the law requires the commissioner's approval for 
a certain action without a deemer clause, that approval must 
be express. The commissioner's disapproval of an action is 
assumed if the commissioner does not act within 60 days after 
receiving the application for approval or give notice of the 
commissioner's reasonable extension of that time period with 
the commissioner's reasons for the extension. Assumed disap-
proval under this subsection entitles the aggrieved person to 
request agency action under Section 63G-4-201. 
(2) When the law provides that a certain action is not 
effective if disapproved by the commissioner within a certain 
period, the affirmative approval by the commissioner may 
make the action effective at a designated earlier date, but not 
earlier than the date of the commissioner's affirmative ap-
proval. 
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to the extent that 
the law specifically provides otherwise. 2008 
31A-2-303. Notice. 
(1) If the commissioner determines that the number of 
persons affected by a proposed action is so great as to render 
it impracticable to serve each person affected with a copy of an 
order, notice of hearing, or other notice, the commissioner 
shall: 
(a) provide a copy of the order, notice of hearing, or 
other notice to all persons who have filed with the 
department a general request to be informed of this type 
of action, or if fewer than ten persons have requested this 
type of notice, provide a copy to those who have and aWo 
to others affected by the notice or order so that at least ten 
persons receive the notice or order who are collectively 
representative of the class of persons whose legal status, 
pecuniary interests, or other substantial interests will be 
affected by the proposed action; and 
(b) publish a copy of the order, notice of hearing, or 
other notice under Subsection (2). 
(2) When this title requires the commissioner to publish an 
order, notice of hearing, or other document in newspapers, the 
commissioner shall cause the notice or order to be published at 
least once during each of the four weeks preceding the 
hearing, effective date, or other critical event, in at least two 
newspapers with sufficient circulation and appropriate loca-
tion to best provide actual notice. 1987 
31A-2-304. Auxiliary procedural powers. 
The commissioner, or his delegate authorized for a particu-
lar matter over his handwritten signature, may administer 
oaths, take testimony, issue subpoenas, and take depositions 
in connection with any hearing, meeting, examination, inves-
tigation, or other proceeding that the commissioner may 
conduct. The subpoena shall have the same effect and shall be 
served in the same manner as if issued from a court of record. 
Sections 78B-1-131 and 78B-6-313 apply to the enforcement of 
the process issued by the commissioner or his delegate. 2008 
31A-2-305. Immunity from prosecution. 
(1) If a natural person declines to appear, testify, or produce 
any record or document in any proceeding instituted by the 
commissioner or in obedience to the subpoena of the commis-
sioner, the commissioner may apply to a judge of the district 
court where the proceeding is held for an order to the person 
to attend, testify, or produce records or documents as re-
quested by the commissioner. In the event a witness asserts a 
privilege against self-incrimination, testimony and evidence 
from the witness may be compelled pursuant to Title 77. 
Chapter 22b, Grants of Immunity. 
(2) If a person claims the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and refuses to appear, testify, or produce documents in 
response to probative evidence against him in a proceeding tc 
revoke or suspend his license, and if the testimony or docu-
ments would have been admissible as evidence in a court o1 
law except for the Fifth Amendment privilege, the refusal tc 
appear, testify, or produce documents is, for noncriminal 
proceedings only, rebuttable evidence of the facts on which the 
proceeding is based. 199". 
31A-2-306. Judicial review — Costs. 
(1)A person aggrieved by a rule or order of the commis 
sioner, or aggrieved by the commissioner's failure to act wher 
he has a duty to act, may obtain judicial review. 
(2) The court reviewing agency actions governed by thi* 
title shall give priority to those actions and shall hear am 
determine them promptly 
(3) Costs shall be awarded as in civil cases. If the court finds 
that the appeal from action or inaction stemmed from the bac 
faith or malice of the commissioner, the court may aware 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing petitioner. Sectior 
63G-7-701 applies to the extent the attorney's fees awardec 
under this subsection exceed $10,000 for any one appeal. 
200. 
31 A-2-306.5. Stay of commissioner's decision pending 
administrative review or judicial appeal. 
(1) An order of the commissioner or a designee of tru 
commissioner is not stayed by a petition for: 
(a) administrative review; 
(b) rehearing; or 
(c) judicial review. 
(2) A person seeking to stay an order of the commissioner o: 
a designee of the commissioner shall seek a stay in accordano 
with: 
(a) rules made by the commissioner in accordance witl 
Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemakini 
Act, pending a petition for: 
(i) administrative review; or 
(ii) rehearing; or 
(b) Section 63G-4-405, pending judicial review. 200 
31A-2-307. Declaratory interpretation of statutes -
Procedure. 
(1) The commissioner or any other person with a substan 
tial interest in the result may petition the Third District Cour 
for Salt Lake County for a declaratory judgment interpretin 
any provision of this title as applied to stipulated facts. 
(2) The court may require that notice be given to person 
that may be affected by the judgment. These persons ma 
participate in the proceeding. 
(3) The court in its discretion may require the commit 
sioner and any other participating parties to provide test: 
mony and documentary evidence necessary for a fair dispos: 
tion of the case. 
(4) The court may decline to proceed on the petition if i 
believes the petition is frivolous, or the declaratory relief i 
unnecessary or has the possibility of prejudicing persons wb 
cannot practicably be made parties to the proceeding. 
(5) The court may declare the meaning of the statute. Th 
declaration has the effect of a final judgment or decree. 
(6) Any participating party may obtain judicial review < 
the decision. 
(7) The costs of the proceeding shall be paid by the pet 
tioner unless the commissioner is the petitioner, in which cas 
all parties shall bear their own costs. "Costs" means: 
(a) fees of the clerk and marshal; Digitized by th  Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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FOLLOW-UP STATEMENT TO INSURANCE CODE 
TASK FORCE 
September 3, 1985 
RE: Chapter 15, Unauthorized Insurers 
and Surplus Lines 
Clark B. Fetzer, Assistant Attorney General, submits 
this follow-up statement on behalf of the Insurance Departments 
The Department supports adoption of the amendments 
proposed in Exhibits D-l through D-3, E, and F, to the statement 
of Alan J. Maguire of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae« There is a 
particular need for the amendment proposed in Exhibit D-l, which 
sets specific financial standards for unauthorized insurers with 
which a broker may place insurance. Hy first reading of sub-
sections 5 and 6 of section 31A-15-103 alerted me to the need for 
more definite standards* Please note that the version of the 
amendments to this section proposed by the Insurance Department 
contains a subparagraph (b) which was omitted in Exhibit D-l* 
That subparagraph immediately follows subparagraph (6) (a) Ci) , and 
is as follows: 
(b) No surplus lines broker may, either 
knowingly or without reasonable investigation 
of the financial condition and general repu-
tation of the insurer, place insurance under 
this section with insurers not satisfying the 
above requirements or with insurers engaging 
in unfair practices, or with otherwise sub-
standard insurers, without giving the appli-
cant notice in writing of the known deficien-
cies of the insurer or the limitations on his 
i 
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investigation, and explaining the need to 
place the business with such an insurer. 
Copies of such notices shall be kept in the 
office of the broker for at least five years. 
Insurers on the "doubtful" list under subsec-
tion (6) (d) of this section and insurers not 
qualifying under subsections (i) to (iii) of 
this subsection or not appearing on the com-
missioner's "eligible* list under subsection 
(iv) of this section are presumed to be sub-
standard. 
This paragraph (b) replaces existing Subsection (6" , so I hat ',. he 
numbering; of existing Subsections (?) # (8) and (9) can be 
retained. 
In Mr* Maguire's Exhibit D-3, it appears that 
subst i tut ing "to" for "i f" would effectuate the intent of the 
proposal. 
In addition to the proposals advanced by Mr. Maguire, 
the Department urges adoption of the following amendments# the 
first of v/hich is taken from the NAIC model Non Admitted Insur-
ance Act 
1. In Subsection 31A-J 5-J 02(3), add new subparagraphs 
(d) , (e)
 t (f) r (g) i (h) i and (i ) so that Subsection (3) reads as 
follows: 
(3) Subsection (1) does not prohibit: 
. (a) an attorney acting for a client; 
(b) a full-time salaried employee of an 
insured acting in the capacity of an 
insurance buyer or manager; 
(c) insurance activities described under 
Section 31A-15-103; 
(d) matters authorized to be done by the 
commissioner under Section 31A-2-309; 
(e) transactions for wh4ch a certificate oi 
authority to dfr-4yisiness 1^4101 required of 
-2-
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an insurer under the insurance laws of this 
state; 
(rt) reinsurance; 
2. In Subsection 31A-15-103(7), divide the subsection 
into paragraphs (a) and (b), and insert a requirement that the 
disclosure be given before the time the policy is delivered. The 
Department proposes the following form: 
(7)(a) A policy issued under this section 
shall'include a description of the subject of 
the insurancer and indicate the coverage, 
conditions and term of the insurance, the 
premium charged and premium taxes to be col-
lected from the policyholder, and the name 
and address of the policyholder and insurer. 
If the direct risk is assumed by more than 
one insurer, the policy shall state the names 
and addresses of all insurers and the portion 
of the entire direct risk each has assumed. 
(b) When it becomes apparent that coverage 
will be placed with a surplus lines insurer, 
the surplus lines broker is obligated to 
promptly furnish to the prospective insured a 
statement in a form prescribed or approved by 
the commissioner, informing the prospective 
insured that coverage is being placed with an 
insurer that has no certificate of authority 
in this state, that the policy is being is-
sued and delivered as a surplus lines 
-3-
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coverage pursuant to this'chapter, that the 
policyholder will not be protected by the 
Utah guaranty association laws against de-
fault of the insurer, and that Utah law 
requires payment by the policyholder of the 
tax prescribed under 31A-3-301. Nothing 
herein shall be construed to impose any civil 
liability upon the surplus lines broker who 
fails to provide the information required by 
this subsection. The surplus lines broker 
failing to furnish this statement shall be 
liable for the penalties prescribed by 
chapter 2, 
3 The Department also supports a provision for organ-
izations such as the Surplus Lines Association of Utah/ and sug^ -
gests adopting section 10 of the NAIC model Surplus Lines Insur-
ance Act, set forth in Exhibit B to Mr, Magui re's statement* 
Adopting the NAIC model wi II give Utah the benefits of NAIC's 
work on the subject, including uniformity with the laws of other 
states that adopt the model, 
1. In Section 31A-3-3 01, insert language exempting the 
state from the surplus lines tax. 
5. In Subsection 31A-23-204(3), add the following 
after the second sentence: 
Additionally, the Commissioner shall require 
the applicant to file with the commissioner, 
and maintain during the term of the license, 
in force and unimpaired, a bond in favor of 
this state in the penal sum of $20,000, ag-
gregate liability, with corporate sureties 
approved by the commissioner. The bond shall 
be conditioned that the surplus lines broker 
will conduct business in accordance with 
provisions of this title and will promptly 
remit the taxes as provided by law. No bond 
shall be terminated unless at least thirty 
days1 prior written notice is given to the 
broker and to the commissioner. 
In my statement dated August 12, 1985r I urged adoption 
of the amendments proposed in Mr. Maguire's statement, in Ilea of 
-4-
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making other proposals for substantive and "housekeeping" changes 
in Chapter 15. I now submit those proposals, 
1. Include a reference to the definition of "unauthor-
ized insurer" under Subsection 31A-1-30K84) . 
2. In present Subsection 31A~15-103(5)(d), the first 
and second sentences refer to "lists" while the third sentence 
states, "In making this second ULsfc. . . ." (emphasis added) . The 
reference to a single list is confusing. 
3. In present Subsection 31A-15-103(5)(d), amend the 
last sentence -to read 
No action lies against thp commissioner or any 
employee of the department for any written or 
oral communication made inr or in connection 
with the issuance of, these lists or evaluations. 
I propose the above language or some variation thereof in lieu of 
the phrase "anything said in the issuance of these lists or 
evaluations," which is imprecise and may afford too narrow 
protection. 
4. in Subsection 31A-15-103O) , insert "as is 
required" between "for" and "comparable policies." Without the 
insert, the sentence is incomplete. 
5. Amend Subsection 31A-15-105C3) by (1) inserting "or 
in any manner aided, directly or indirectly," between "assisted" 
and "in the procurement of an illegal contract"; (2) deleting 
"and who knew or should have known the transaction was illegal"; 
and (3) adding a second sentence: "The receiver appointed under 
Chapter 27 may assert the claims of insureds if the insurer is 
the subject of a proceeding under Chapter 27." The first 
amendment continues the broader sweep of section 31-38-3(3)(b), 
-5-
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which includes persons other than salesmen who may nevertheless 
be as culpable in procuring illegal contracts. This broader 
reach can be an important tool of the Commissioner. See below. 
The second amendment also perpetuates the intent and effect of 
section 31-38-3(3) (b) and similar statutes of other sates, which 
places the risk of a contract being illegal on those who attempt 
to procure the signature of an insured, rather than of on the 
insured, who is not as ] ikely to know the contract is illegal. 
The third amendment clears up a question of" the Commissioner's 
standing in the context of a delinquency proceeding under Chapter 
27. Giving the Commissioner this standing increases judicial 
efficiency and economy by allowing the commissioner to "stand in 
the shoes" of many insureds; the court need hear only one action 
instead of many. The Department currently has at least two 
delinquency proceedings involving unauthorized insurers pending 
before the Third District Clour f J n which Section 31-3 8-3 (3) (b) is 
implicated, particularly the Commissioner's standing to assert 
the claims of insureds. 
6 Make it clear that the Commissioner's rights and 
remedies under Section 31A-2-308 apply to nonadmitted insurers 
for violations of chapter 15, rules implementing Chapter 15, and 
orders under Subsection 31A-2-20K4) enforcing Chapter 15, 
7. in Subsection 31A-15-106M ) , substitute "viol ating 
this chapter" for '"being in violation of Utah law." 'This sub-
stitution confines^ the exception to Chapter 1 5j. which is all that 
is necessary. 
-6-
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8. In Subsections 31A^15-110(1) and (2), substitute 
"has reason to believe" for "knows." The knowledge standard 
arguably excuses an adjuster from informing the Commissioner 
unless the adjuster is absolutely certain a contract is illegal. 
Housekeeping 
1. In Subsection 31A-15-106U) , second sentence, I 
believe the reference should be to Section 31A-3-301. 
2. in Subsection 31A-15-106(2), substitute "exists" 
for "exist" ["unless one . . . exists"]. 
CLARK B. FETZER & 
Assistant Attorney General 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephones (801) 533-5319 
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UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS ACT 31-38-2 
able him to determine whether arrangements for payment of medical serv-
ices are subject to the provisions of this act. 
History: I». 1969, ch. 79, § 26. 
Repealing Clause. 
Section 27 of Laws 1969, ch. 79 pro-
vided: "Chapter 30 of Title 31, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, is hereby repealed." 
Effective Date and Savings Clause. 
Section 28 of Laws 1969, ch. 79 pro-
vided: "This act shall take effect on July 
1, 1969, but any corporation organized 
prior to the passage of this act, under the 
laws of the state of Utah relating to 
corporations not for profit, for the pur-
CHAPTER 38 
UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS ACT 
Section 31-38-1. Title of act. 
31-38-2. Purpose of act. 
31-38-3. Transacting insurance business in state without certificate of au-
thority unlawful—Exceptions—What constitutes transaction—Ef-
fect of failure to obtain certificate. 
31-38-4. Violations—Injunctive relief. 
31-38-5. Service of process—Appointment of secretary of state as agent— 
Method of service—Sufficiency—Default judgment. 
31-3S-6. Defense of action by unauthorized insurer—Requirements. 
31-38-7. Enforcement of orders or decisions—Reciprocity—foreign decrees. 
31-38-8. Penalty for violation of act. 
31-38-1. Title of act.—This act shall he known and may he cited as 
the "Utah Unauthorized Insurers Act." 
History: L. 1969, ch. 80, §1. surers; providing for service of process on 
unauthorized insurers as to both admin-
Title of Act. istrative and court proceedings and re-
An act relating to insurance; requiring quirements on such insurers when they 
insurers who transact insurance business defend same; prescribing for enforcement 
in the state to obtain a certificate of au- of decision and decrees in this state and 
thority from the insurance commissioner; in reciprocal state; providing for proce-
providing exceptions; defining what con- dure regarding foreign decrees; and pro-
stitutes the transaction of insurance; scribing penalties.—L. 1969, ch. 80. 
authorizing injunctive relief against in-
31-38-2. Purpose of act.—The purpose of this act is to subject certain 
insurers to the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner and the courts of 
this state in suits by or on behalf of the state. The legislature declares 
that it is concerned with the protection of residents of this state against 
acts by insurers not authorized to do an insurance business in this state, 
by the maintenance of fair and honest insurance markets, by protecting 
authorized insurers, which are subject to regulation from unfair competition 
by unauthorized insurers, and by protecting against the evasion of the 
insurance regulatory laws of this state. In furtherance of such state 
interest, the legislature herein provides methods for substituted service 
of process upon such insurers in any proceeding, suit or action in any 
345 
pose of administering, maintaining, and 
operating a health service plan, as de-
scribed in this act, shall be allowed a pe-
riod of one year after the effective date 
of this act to make the applications and 
filings necessary to meet the requirements 
of this act, and further, provided that 
Buch a corporation shall be allowed a pe-
riod of five years after the effective date 
of this act to establish the liquid reserves 
and deposit the guarantee fund with the 
commissioner as required by section 31-
37-H." 
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31-38-3 INSURANCE 
court and substituted service of any notice, order, pleading or process 
upon such insurers in any proceeding by the commissioner of insurance 
to enforce or effect full compliance with the insurance laws of this state. 
In so doing, the state exercises its powers to protect residents of this state 
and to define what constitutes transacting an insurance business in this 
state, and also exercises powers and privileges available to this state by 
virtue of Public Law 79-15, 79th Congress of the United States, Chapter 
20,1st Session, S. 340, 59 Stat. 33; 15 U.S.C. sections 1011 to 1015 inclusive, 
as amended, which declares that the business of insurance and every person 
engaged herein shall be subject to the laws of the several states. 
History; L. 1969, ch. 80, § 2. 
31-38-3. Transacting insurance business in state without certificate of 
authority unlawful—Exceptions—What constitutes transaction—Effect of 
failure to obtain certificate.—(1) It shall be unlawful for any insurer to 
transact insurance business in this state, as set forth in subsection (2) of 
this section, without a certificate of authority from the commissioner; 
provided, however, that this section shall not apply to: 
(a) The lawful transaction of surplus lines insurance. 
(b) The lawful transaction of reinsurance by insurers. 
(c) Transactions in this state involving a policy lawfully solicited, 
written, and delivered outside of this state covering only subjects of in-
surance not resident, located, or expressly to be performed in this state 
at the time of issuance, and which transactions are subsequent to the 
issuance of such policy. 
(d) Transactions in this state involving life insurance, disability 
insurance or annuities provided to or by education or religious or chari-
table institutions organized and operated without profit to any private 
shareholder or individual for the benefit of such institutions and individ-
uals engaged in the service of such institutions. 
(e) Attorneys acting in the ordinary relation of attorney and client 
in the adjustment of claims or losses. 
(f) Transactions in this state involving group life and group sickness 
and accident or blanket sickness and accident insurance or group an-
nuities where the master policy of such groups was lawfully issued and 
delivered in and pursuant to the laws of a state in which the insurer was 
authorized to do an insurance business, to a group organized for purposes 
other than the procurement of insurance, and where the policyholder is 
domiciled or otherwise has a bona fide situs. 
(g) Transactions in this state involving any policy of insurance or 
annuity contract issued prior to the effective date of this act. 
(h) Transactions in this state relative to a policy issued or to be issued 
outside this state involving insurance on vessels, craft or hulls, cargoes, 
marine builder's risk, marine protection and indemnity or other risk, 
including strikes and war risks commonly insured under ocean or wet 
marine forms of policy. 
(i) Transactions pursuant to section 31-15-19, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
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UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS ACT 31-38-3 
(2) Any of the following acts in this state effected by mail or otherwise 
by or on behalf of an unauthorized insurer is deemed to constitute the 
transaction of an insurance business in this state. The venue of an act 
committed by mail is at the point where the matter transmitted by mail 
is delivered and takes effect. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "in-
surer" as used in this section includes all corporations, associations, partner-
ships and individuals, engaged as principals in the business of insurance 
and also includes interinsurance exchanges and mutual benefit societies. 
(a) The making of or proposing to make, as an insurer, an insurance 
contract. 
(b) The making of or proposing to make, as guarantor or surety, any 
contract of guaranty or suretyship as a vocation and not merely incidental 
to any other legitimate business or activity of the guarantor or surety. 
(c) The taking or receiving of any application for insurance. 
(d) The receiving or collection of any premium, commission, member-
ship fees, assessments, dues or other consideration for any insurance or 
any part thereof. 
(e) The issuance or delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of 
this state or to persons authorized to do business in this state. 
(f) Directly or indirectly acting as an agent for or otherwise represent-
ing or aiding on behalf of another any person or insurer in the solicitation, 
negotiation, procurement or effectuation of insurance or renewals thereof 
or in the dissemination of information as to coverage or rates, or for-
warding of applications, or delivery of policies or contracts, or inspec-
tion of risks, a fixing of rates or investigation or adjustment of claims or 
losses or in the transaction of matters subsequent to effectuation of the 
contract and arising out of it, or in any other manner representing or 
assisting a person or insurer in the transaction of insurance with respect 
to subjects of insurance resident, located or to be performed in this state. 
The provisions of this subsection (2) shall not operate to prohibit full-
time salaried employees of a corporate insured from acting in the capacity 
of an insurance manager or buyer in placing insurance in behalf of such 
employer. 
(g) The transaction of any kind of insurance business specifically 
recognized as transacting an insurance business within the meaning of the 
statutes relating to insurance, 
(h) The transacting or proposing to transact any insurance business in 
substance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to 
evade the provisions of the statutes. 
(3) (a) The failure of an insurer transacting insurance business in 
this state to obtain a certificate of authority shall not impair the validity 
of any act or contract of such insurer and shall not prevent such insurer 
from defending any action at law or suit in equity in any court of this 
state, but no insurer transacting insurance business in this state without 
a certificate of authority shall be permitted to maintain an action in any 
court of this state to enforce any right, claim or demand arising out of 
the transaction of such business until such insurer shall have obtained a 
certificate of authority. 
347 
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31-38-4 INSURANCE 
(b) In the event of failure of any such unauthorized insurer to pay any 
claim or loss within the provisions of such insurance contract, any person 
who assisted or in any manner aided directly or indirectly in the procure-
ment of such insurance contract shall be liable to the insured for the full 
amount of the claim or loss in the manner provided by the provisions of 
such insurance contract. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 80, § 3. Collateral References. 
Insurance*®^. 
Compiler's Notes. 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 70. 
Chapter 80 of Laws 1969 carried no ef- 43 Am. Jur. 2d 135, Insurance § 73. 
fective date clause. 
Jurisdictional acts described in statutes 
Cross-Beference. dealing with insurance contracts, 23 A. L. 
Prearranged funeral plans, 22-4-1 et seq. E. 3d 606. 
31-38-4. Violations—Injunctive relief.—Whenever the commissioner be-
lieves, from evidence satisfactory to him, that any insurer is violating or 
about to violate the provisions of section 31-38-3, the commissioner may, 
through the attorney general of this state, cause a complaint to be filed 
in the district court of Salt Lake County to enjoin and restrain such insurer 
from continuing such violation or engaging therein or doing any act in 
furtherance thereof. The court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding 
and shall have the power to make and enter an order or judgment award-
ing such preliminary or final injunctive relief as in its judgment is proper. 
History: I>. 1969, cH. 80, § 4. 
31-38-5. Service of process—Appointment of secretary of state as 
agent—Method of service—Sufficiency—Default judgment.—(1) Any act 
of transacting an insurance business as set forth in section 31-38-3 by any 
unauthorized insurer is equivalent to and shall constitute an irrevocable 
appointment by such insurer, binding upon him, his executor or administra-
tor, or successor in interest if a corporation, of the secretary of state, or 
his successor in office, to be the true and lawful attorney of such insurer 
upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action, suit, or pro-
ceeding in any court by the commissioner of insurance or by the state 
and upon whom may be served any notice, order, pleading or process 
in any proceeding before tl^ e commissioner of insurance and which arises 
out of transacting an insurance business in this state by such insurer. Any 
act of transacting an insurance business in this state by any unauthor-
ized insurer shall be signification of its agreement that any such lawful 
process in such court action, suit, or proceeding and any such notice, order, 
pleading, or process in such administrative proceeding before the com-
missioner of insurance so served shall be of the same legal force and 
validity as personal service of process in this state upon such insurer. 
(2) Service of process in such action shall be made by delivering to 
and leaving with the secretary of state, or some person in apparent charge 
of his office, two copies thereof and by payment to the secretary of state 
of the fee prescribed by law. Service upon the secretary of state as such 
attorney shall be service upon the principal. 
348 
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UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS ACT 31-38-6 
(3) The secretary of state shall forthwith forward by certified mail 
one of the copies of such process or such notice, order, pleading, or process 
in proceedings before the commissioner to the defendant in such court 
proceeding or to whom the notice, order, pleading, or process in such ad-
ministrative proceeding is addressed or directed at its last-known principal 
place of business and shall keep a record of all process so served on him 
which shall show the day and hour of service. Such service is sufficient, if: 
(a) Notice of such service and a copy of the court process or the 
notice, order, pleading, or process in such administrative proceeding are 
sent within ten days thereafter by certified mail by the plaintiff or the 
plaintiff's attorney in the court proceeding or by the commissioner of 
insurance in the administrative proceeding to the defendant in the court 
proceeding or to whom the notice, order, pleading, or process in such 
administrative proceeding is addressed or directed at the last-known prin-
cipal place of business of the defendant in the court or administrative 
proceeding. 
(b) The defendant's receipt or receipts issued by the post office with 
which the letter is certified, showing the name of the sender of the letter 
and the name and address of the person or insurer to whom the letter is 
addressed, and an affidavit of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney in 
court proceeding or of the commissioner of insurance in administrative 
proceeding, showing compliance therewith are filed with the clerk of the 
court in which such action, suit, or proceeding is pending or with the 
commissioner in administrative proceedings, on or before the date the 
defendant in the court or administrative proceeding is required to appear 
or respond thereto, or within such further time as the court or commissioner 
of insurance may allow. 
(4) No plaintiff shall be entitled to a judgment or a determination by 
default in any court or administrative proceeding in which court process 
or notice, order, pleading, or process in proceedings before the commissioner 
of insurance is served under this section until the expiration of 45 days 
from the date of filing of the affidavit of compliance. 
(5) Nothing in this section shall limit or affect the right to serve any 
process, notice, order, or demand upon any person or insurer in any other 
manner now or hereafter permitted by law. 
History: L. 1969, en. 80, §5. to service of process in action on policy, 
« « - . , • » *
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Collateral References. 
Insurance<8=>26. *»aw Review. 
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 83. In Personam Jurisdiction Expanded: 
43 Am. Jur. 2d 152, Insurance § 88. Utah's Long-Arm Statute, 1970 "Utah L. Foreign insurance company as subject Rev. 222. 
31-38-6. Defense of action by unauthorized insurer—Requirements.— 
(1) Before any unauthorized insurer files or causes to be filed in any 
pleading in any court action, suit or proceeding or in any notice, order, 
pleading, or process in sucb administrative proceeding before the com-
missioner instituted against such person or insurer, by seryices made as 
provided in section 31-38-5, such insurer shall either: 
849 
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31-38-7 INSURANCE 
(a). Deposit with the clerk of the court in which such action, suit, 
or proceeding is pending, or with the commissioner of insurance in adminis-
trative proceedings before the commissioner, cash or securities, or file with 
such clerk or commissioner a bond with good and sufficient sureties, to be 
approved by the clerk or commissioner in an amount to be fixed by the 
court or commissioner sufficient to secure the payment of any final judgment 
which may be rendered in such action or administrative proceeding. 
(b) Procure a certificate of authority to transact the business of 
insurance in this state. 
(2) The commissioner of insurance, in any administrative proceeding 
in which service is made as provided in section 31-38-5, may in his discre-
tion, order such postponement as may be necessary to afford the defendant 
reasonable opportunity to comply with the provisions of subsection (1) of 
this section and to defend such action. 
(3) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall be construed to 
prevent an unauthorized insurer from filing a motion to quash a writ 
or to set aside service thereof made in the manner provided in section 
31-38-5, on the ground that such unauthorized insurer has not done any of 
the acts enumerated in section 31-38-3. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 80, § 6. 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 83. 
43 Am. Jur. 2d 152, Insurance S 88. CoUateral References. 
Insurance@=»26. 
31-38-7. Enforcement of orders or decisions — Reciprocity — Foreign 
decrees.—The attorney general upon request of the commissioner may 
proceed in the courts of this state or any reciprocal state to enforce an 
order or decision in any court proceeding or in any administrative pro-
ceeding before the commissioner of insurance. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) The words "reciprocal state" mean any state or territory of the 
United States the laws of which contain procedures substantially similar 
to those specified in this section for the enforcement of decrees or orders 
in equity issued by courts located in other states or territories of the 
United States, against any insurer incorporated or authorized to do busi-
ness in said state or territory. 
(b) The words "foreign decree" mean any decree or order in equity 
of a court located in a reciprocal state, including a court of the United 
States located therein, against any insurer incorporated or authorized to 
do business in this state. 
(c) The words "qualified party" mean a state regulatory agency acting 
in its capacity to enforce the insurance laws of its state. 
(2) The insurance commissioner of this state shall determine which 
states and territories qualify as reciprocal states and shall maintain at all 
times an up-to-date list of such states. 
(3) A copy of any foreign decree authenticated in accordance with the 
statutes of this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any district 
court of this state. The clerk, upon verifying with the insurance com-
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UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS ACT 31-38-8 
missioner that the decree or order qualifies as a foreign decree, shall treat 
the foreign decree in the same manner as a decree of a district court of 
this state. A foreign decree so filed has the same effect and shall be deemed 
as a decree of a district court of this state, and is subject to the same pro-
cedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as 
a decree of a district court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied 
in like manner. 
(4) (a) At the time of the filing of the foreign decree, the attorney 
general shall make and file with the clerk of the court an affidavit setting 
forth the name and last-known post-office address of the defendant. 
(b) Promptly upon the filing of the foreign decree and the affidavit, 
the clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign decree to the defend-
ant at the address given and to the insurance commissioner of this state 
and shall make a note of the mailing in the docket. In addition, the at-
torney general may mail a notice of the filing of the foreign decree to 
the defendant and to the insurance commissioner of this state and may 
file proof of mailing with the clerk. Lack of mailing notice of filing by 
the clerk shall riot affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing by 
the attorney general has been filed. 
(c) No execution or other process for enforcement of a foreign decree 
filed hereunder shall issue until thirty days after the date the decree is 
filed. 
(5) (a) If the defendant shows the district court that an appeal 
from the foreign decree is pending or will be taken, or that a stay of 
execution has been granted, the court shall stay enforcement of the for-
eign decree until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, 
or the stay of execution expires or is vacated, upon proof that the defend-
ant has furnished the security for the satisfaction of the decree required 
by the state in which it was rendered. 
(h) If the defendant shows the district court any ground upon which 
enforcement of a decree of any district court of this state would be stayed, 
the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign decree for an appropriate 
period, upon requiring the same security for satisfaction of the decree 
which is required in this state. 
(6) Any person filing a foreign decree shall pay to the clerk of court 
the fee required for filing a complaint in the district court. Fees for docket-
ing, transcription or other enforcement proceedings shall be as provided 
for decrees of the district court. 
History: I». 1969, ch. 80, § 7. 
31-38-8, Penalty for violation of act.—Any unauthorized insurer who 
transacts any unauthorized act of an insurance business as set forth in this 
act may be fined not more than ten thousand dollars. 
History: Ii. 1969, cfc. 80, § 8. the remainder of this act shall not "be 
affected thereby." Separability Clause. 
Section 9 of Laws 1969, ch. 80 pro- CoUateral Beferencea. 
vided: "If any provision of this act, or Insurance@=>27. 
the application of any provision to any 44 C.J.S. Insurance §86. 
person or circumstance, 19 held invalid, 43 Am. Jur. 2d 152, insurance § 88. 
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